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[T]hen wilt thou not be loath
To leave this Paradise, but shalt possess




In the fall of 2009, President Barack Obama spoke to public school
students at the beginning of the new school year.3  Though previous
presidents (Republicans among them) had made similar speeches,
President Obama’s address to students generated intense opposition,
and many school districts made some form of accommodation to those
offended by the President’s plan.4  While our era rarely sees political
opposition that is not intense, this protest reflected something more
than short-lived, knee-jerk contrarianism.  Driving the opposition was
a profound suspicion that the public school system is a primary agent
in “Big Government’s” efforts to indoctrinate children in a left-wing
ideological agenda.5  The chairman of the Florida Republican Party
spoke for many when he said that the speech was an effort to “spread
President Obama’s socialist ideology.”6  Indeed, the fear that our
schools were being “turned over to some socialist movement” was the
emphatic undercurrent of objection to the President’s speech.7  Of
course, this protest was not about the takeover of our nation’s indus-
tries.  The concern—more grave than fear of Soviet-style economic
planning—was that our children’s values, if not their very souls, were
being collectivized.
This fear is not new to political and social disagreements.  The fu-
ror over President Obama’s speech bears provocative resemblances to
other campaigns to determine how the nation’s schools should incul-
cate values in children (or, if they should inculcate values) and what
values should be transmitted.  The nineteenth century saw a pro-
tracted and, at times, even violent struggle to decide whether public
schools would hold onto their monopoly over public funding.8  Fiercely
protesting that the public schools had “assumed the exclusive right of
2. JOHN MILTON, Paradise Lost, in JOHN MILTON: THE COMPLETE POEMS 119, 404
(John Leonard ed., Penguin Books 1998) (1667).
3. James C. McKinley, Jr. & Sam Dillon, Some Parents Oppose Obama Speech to
Children, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 3, 2009, at A1.
4. See Sam Dillon, In School Speech Obama Avoids Political Issues, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 7, 2009, at A14.  In a wealth of accommodating spirit, some school districts
decided not to show the speech at all. Id.
5. See McKinley & Dillon, supra note 3.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. See DIANE RAVITCH, THE GREAT SCHOOL WARS 20–158 (1974).
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monopolizing the education of youth,”9 Catholics argued that the
seemingly secular education provided by the schools was really in-
struction in the “sectarianism of infidelity.”10  In their view, state con-
trol of education would lead to even more ominous monopolies:
Should the professors of some weak or unpopular religion be oppressed today,
the experiment may be repeated tomorrow on some other.  Every successful
attempt in that way will embolden the spirit of encroachment and diminish
the power of resistance; and, in such an event, the monopolizers of education
after having discharged the office of public tutor, may find it convenient to
assume that of public preacher.  The transition will not be found difficult or
unnatural from the idea of common school to that of a common religion . . . .11
Catholics lost this battle, but the war against state-controlled edu-
cation would remain a hotly contested one.12  In 1922, the voters of
Oregon approved an initiative mandating public education for chil-
dren under sixteen years old.  The case that arose from this monopo-
listic measure, Pierce v. Society of Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus
and Mary,13 reached the Supreme Court in 1925, destined to become a
constitutional and cultural landmark.  The shadow of socialist child-
raising was never far from the legal debate.  Two years earlier, in a
separate education case concerning a state prohibition of foreign lan-
guage teaching,14 law professor William Dameron Guthrie filed an
amicus brief specifically to address the Oregon compulsory public
school law, the constitutionality of which was certain to come before
the Court.  Guthrie described the Oregon act as “a revolutionary piece
of legislation,” evoking images of Bolshevik menace:
It adopts the favorite device of communistic Russia—the destruction of paren-
tal authority, the standardization of education despite the diversity of charac-
ter, aptitude, inclination and physical capacity of children, and the
monopolization by the state of the training and teaching of the young.  The
love and interest of the parent for his child, such a statute condemns as evil;
the instinctive preferences and desires of the child itself, such a law represses
as if mere manifestations of an incorrigible or baneful disposition.15
The law was not only communistic, it was platonic.  Guthrie deplored
“[t]he notion of Plato that in a Utopia the state would be the sole re-
pository of parental authority and duty and the children be surren-
dered to it for upbringing and education.”16  On behalf of the
9. Id. at 49 (quoting W.M. OLAND BOURNE, HISTORY OF THE PUBLIC SCHOOL SOCIETY
OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK 334 (New York, WM. Wood & Co. 1870)).
10. Id. at 48 (quoting BOURNE, supra note 9, at 332).
11. Id. at 49 (quoting BOURNE, supra note 9, at 338).
12. For a rich and provocative treatment of this contest, see generally Barbara Ben-
nett Woodhouse, “Who Owns the Child?”: Meyer and Pierce and the Child as
Property, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 995 (1992).
13. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
14. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
15. Brief for William D. Guthrie & Bernard Hershkopf as Amici Curiae Supporting
Plaintiff-in-Error at 3, Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (No. 325).
16. Id.
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defendants opposing the language prohibition, attorney Arthur F.
Mullen portrayed the case as one about “the power of a legislative ma-
jority to take the child from the parent.”17  This, Mullen insisted, was
“the principle of the soviet.”18  It was strong rhetoric—and it was ef-
fective.  Striking down the foreign language prohibition, Justice Mc-
Reynolds followed, and bettered, Guthrie’s dislike of classical models
of education.  He compared the language prohibition statute to the
communistic parenting measures of ancient Sparta19 and Plato’s Re-
public.20  For the Court, such measures rested on an allocation of edu-
cational control wholly at odds with the letter and spirit of the
Constitution.21
In 1925, the Supreme Court struck down Oregon’s compulsory edu-
cation law, finding that it “unreasonably interfere[d] with the liberty
of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of
children under their control.”22  The Court rejected a ban on private
schooling, but cautiously supported the broad regulatory authority of
the state:
No question is raised concerning the power of the state reasonably to regulate
all schools, to inspect, supervise and examine them, their teachers and pupils;
to require that all children of proper age attend some school, that teachers
shall be of good moral character and patriotic disposition, that certain studies
plainly essential to good citizenship must be taught, and that nothing be
taught which is manifestly inimical to the public welfare.23
Yet, Pierce was more about its rhetorical reach than its legal holding.
Writing for the Court, Justice McReynolds focused the majority opin-
ion on the power of the state “to standardize its children by forcing
them to accept instruction from public teachers only.”24  His anti-stat-
17. Transcript of Oral Argument at 10, Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (No.
325).
18. Id.
19. “In order to submerge the individual and develop ideal citizens, Sparta assembled
the males at seven into barracks and intrusted their subsequent education and
training to official guardians.” Meyer, 262 U.S. at 401–02.
20. “[T]he wives of our guardians are to be common, and their children are to be
common, and no parent is to know his own child, nor any child his parent.” Id.
21. Cf. Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587, 632–33 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
In The Republic and in The Laws, Plato offered a vision of a unified
society, where the needs of children are met not by parents but by the
government, and where no intermediate forms of association stand be-
tween the individual and the state.  The vision is a brilliant one, but it is
not our own . . . .
If we are far removed from the Platonic Republic, it is because our
commitment to diversity and decentralized human relationships has
made us attentive to the danger of Government intrusion on private life.
Id. (citations omitted).
22. Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus & Mary, 268 U.S. 510,
534–35 (1925).
23. Id. at 534.
24. Id. at 535.
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ist rhetoric on high display, Justice McReynolds drafted what the Su-
preme Court would later call “a charter of the rights of parents to
direct the religious upbringing of their children.”25
What role should the state play in the transmission of values?
What values can the state successfully transmit?  How can it do so?
To approach these questions, this Article begins with principles laid
down by the Supreme Court.  It is the state’s duty to ensure that all
schools, public or private, inculcate habits of critical reasoning and re-
flection, a way of thinking that implies a tolerance of and respect for
other points of views.26  In pursuit of this lofty goal, the state need not
make public schooling compulsory.  However, the state must see that
all children are provided an education that is, in the fullest sense,
public—a schooling that gives children the tools they will need to
think for themselves, a schooling that exposes children to other points
of view and to other sources of meaning and value than those they
bring from home.  This effort may well divide child from parent, not
because socialist educators want to indoctrinate children, but because
learning to think for oneself is what children do.  It is one facet of the
overall movement toward the individuation and autonomy that is
“growing up” and is, perhaps, the most natural and vital part of
healthy maturation.  Likewise, we should be entirely candid about the
fact that the inculcation of such habits will be more compatible with
the beliefs of some religious groups than others.
25. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 233 (1972); cf. Richard W. Garnett, Taking
Pierce Seriously: The Family, Religious Education, and Harm to Children, 76 NO-
TRE DAME L. REV. 109, 143 (2000) (describing Pierce as a “ringing endorsement of
religious freedom and of limited government dominion over citizens”).
26. See, e.g., Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 681 (1986) (“These
fundamental values of ‘habits and manners of civility’ essential to a democratic
society must, of course, include tolerance of divergent political and religious
views.”); Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 77 (1979) (“These perceptions of the
public schools as inculcating fundamental values necessary to the maintenance of
a democratic political system have been confirmed by the observations of social
scientists.”); cf. Stephen Macedo, The Constitution, Civic Virtue, and Civil Soci-
ety: Social Capital as Substantive Morality, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1573, 1593
(2001) (“The patterns of social life that support liberal democratic forms of civil
flourishing embody definite rankings of competing human goods, which will be
associated with some versions of religious truth and not others.  In this sense, the
project of promoting a healthy liberal democratic civil society is inevitably a
deeply judgmental and non-neutral project.”). But see, e.g., George W. Dent, Jr.,
Religious Children, Secular Schools, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 863 (1988) (rejecting the
argument that teaching values is a sufficiently compelling interest to override
religious objections to public school curriculum); Charles L. Glenn, How Govern-
ment Schools (May) Displace the Family, in THE FAMILY, CIVIL SOCIETY, AND THE
STATE 219 (Christopher Wolfe ed., 1998); Michael W. McConnell, Education Dis-
establishment: Why Democratic Values Are Ill-Served by Democratic Control of
Schooling, in MORAL AND POLITICAL EDUCATION 87 (Stephen Macedo & Yael
Tamir eds., 2002) (arguing that public schools cannot inculcate democratic values
without compromising liberal commitment to neutrality).
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The state as educator, then, is no ideologically neutral actor. The
philosophical foundations supporting a truly public education are the
liberal biases of our nation’s intellectual forbearers, biases in favor of
a non-authoritarian approach to truth, of free argument and debate
(what Jefferson called truth’s “natural weapons”27), and of a healthy
sense of human fallibility—the foundation, in other words, of our na-
tion’s governmental blueprint.28  Unless children are to live under “a
perpetual childhood of prescription,”29 they must be exposed—intel-
lectually, morally, and spiritually—to the dust and heat of the race.
Whether one considers the formation of moral commitments a matter
of choice or duty, of reflective self-directedness or cultural embedded-
ness, the child must not be denied the type of education that will allow
him, as an adult, to choose whether (and in what way and to what
degree) to honor those commitments.  A public education is the engine
by which children are exposed to “the great sphere” that is their world
and legacy.30  It is their means of escape from, or free commitment to,
27. Thomas Jefferson, The Statute of Virginia for Religious Freedom, in THE VIRGINIA
STATUTE FOR RELIGIOUS FREEDOM: ITS EVOLUTION AND CONSEQUENCES FOR AMERI-
CAN HISTORY, xvii, xviii (Merrill D. Peterson & Robert C. Vaughan eds., 1988).
28. Cf., e.g., United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (S.D.N.Y 1943)
(“[N]either exclusively, nor even primarily, are the interests of the newspaper
industry conclusive; for that industry serves one of the most vital of all general
interests: the dissemination of news from as many different sources, and with as
many different facets and colors as is possible.  That interest is closely akin to, if
indeed it is not the same as, the interest protected by the First Amendment; it
presupposes that right conclusions are more likely to be gathered out of a multi-
tude of tongues, than through any kind of authoritative selection.  To many this
is, and always will be, folly; but we have staked upon it our all.”). But see Stanley
Fish, Children and the First Amendment, 29 CONN. L. REV. 883, 884 (1997)
(“[W]ithout ‘authoritative selection,’ education, whether public or private, would
be impossible.”).  For a defense of the ideologically liberal biases of public educa-
tion, see generally EAMONN CALLAN, CREATING CITIZENS: POLITICAL EDUCATION
AND LIBERAL DEMOCRACY (1997); AMY GUTMANN, DEMOCRATIC EDUCATION (1987);
STEPHEN MACEDO, DIVERSITY AND DISTRUST: CIVIC EDUCATION IN A MULTICUL-
TURAL DEMOCRACY (2000).
29. JOHN MILTON, Areopagitica, in THE PROSE OF JOHN MILTON 265, 286 (J. Max Pat-
rick ed., 1968) (1644).
30. See BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE 159 (1980) (“The
entire educational system will, if you like, resemble a great sphere.  Children
land upon the sphere at different points, depending upon their primary culture;
the task is to help them explore the globe in a way that permits them to glimpse
the deeper meanings of the life dramas passing on around them.  At the end of
the journey, however, the now mature citizen has every right to locate himself at
the very point from which he began—just as he may also strike out to discover an
unoccupied portion of the sphere.”).
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the social group in which they were born.31  It is their best guarantee
of an open future.32
It is naı¨ve to think that the state could not standardize its chil-
dren.  Yet, it is no less naı¨ve to think that children sent to religiously
or ethnically homogeneous private schools, or those kept cloistered at
home, might not suffer a similar fate.  We are cautioned by family law
historian Barbara Bennett Woodhouse that “[s]tamped on the reverse
side of this coinage of family privacy and parental rights are the
child’s voicelessness, objectification, and isolation from the commu-
nity.”33  It is often assumed that state control of education “disserve[s]
the values of pluralism and experimentation,”34 but public education
can bring its students a much needed respite from the ideological sol-
ipsism of the enclosed family.  Public education can physically and in-
tellectually transport the child across the boundaries of home and
community.  Of course, this transportation comes at a cost.  It disrupts
the intramural transmission of values from parent to child.  It threat-
ens to dismantle a familiar world by introducing the child to multiple
sources of authority—and to the possibility that a choice must be
made among them.
Indeed, the open world of public schooling should challenge the
transmission of any closed set of values, whether those values belong
to parent or state.  To the extent that public education fosters “the
cultivation of serious and independent ethical criticism, and the en-
largement of the imagination that process entails,”35 it not only chal-
lenges parental authority but provides a brake on efforts at state
31. Cf. JOHN DEWEY, DEMOCRACY AND EDUCATION 20 (Free Press 1997) (1916) (“[I]t is
the office of the school environment to balance the various elements in the social
environment, and to see to it that each individual gets an opportunity to escape
from the limitations of the social group in which he was born, and to come into
living contact with a broader environment.”).  For a critique of Dewey’s philoso-
phy of democratic education as “civic totalism,” see MACEDO, supra note 28, at
119–45.
32. See Joel Feinberg, The Child’s Right to an Open Future, in WHOSE CHILD?: CHIL-
DREN’S RIGHTS, PARENTAL AUTHORITY, AND STATE POWER 124 (William Aiken &
Hugh LaFollette eds., 1980). But see, e.g., Shelley Burtt, The Proper Scope of
Parental Authority: Why We Don’t Owe Children an “Open Future,” in CHILD,
FAMILY, AND STATE 243 (Stephen Macedo & Iris Marion Young eds., 2003);
Michael W. McConnell, Government, Families, and Power: A Defense of Educa-
tional Choice, 31 CONN. L. REV. 847, 847–52 (1999).
33. Woodhouse, supra note 12, at 1001; cf. ACKERMAN, supra note 30, at 160 (criticiz-
ing educational proposals that would “legitimate[ ] a series of petty tyrannies in
which like-minded parents club together to force-feed their children without
restraint”).
34. Emily Buss, Allocating Developmental Control among Parent, Child and the
State, 2004 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 27, 28 (2004).
35. CALLAN, supra note 28, at 5.
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indoctrination as well.36  Ideally, the interests of the state and parent
would be identical—that is, both would want to cultivate the child’s
capacity to make free choices.  In fact, however, both parent and state
can behave despotically toward young people, demanding (often in a
compassionate voice) uncritical obedience toward authority.  It might
be only natural for parents to want a child to embrace their values and
to believe their beliefs,37 but the expressive liberty of parents becomes
despotic when the child is given no real opportunity to embrace other
values and to believe other beliefs.  Similarly, the liberal state wants
to pass on its traditions of freedom and equality,38 but the surest way
not to do so would be to pass on those traditions as moral absolutes to
be accepted uncritically.39  To guard against indoctrination at home or
at school, (or elsewhere, for that matter), the liberal state must estab-
lish a program of education that encourages—perhaps, requires—chil-
dren to question authority, including the authority to choose
skepticism.  Like any good parent, the state prepares its children to
make choices that are as free and independent as possible.
36. Cf. Stanley Ingber, Socialization, Indoctrination, or the “Pall of Orthodoxy”:
Value Training in the Public Schools, 1987 U. ILL. L. REV. 14, 19 (1987) (“Society
must indoctrinate children so they may be capable of autonomy.  They must be
socialized to the norms of society while remaining free to modify or even abandon
those norms.”); Suzanna Sherry, Responsible Republicanism: Educating for Citi-
zenship, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 131, 188–89 (1995) (“[A] citizen needs to be able both
to understand and internalize the norms of her society and to judge those norms
against rational attack.  A predisposition to adopt certain values, coupled with
the knowledge and critical skills necessary for citizenship, is likely to yield slow
but careful changes that jeopardize nether the stability of the polity nor the liber-
ties of its citizens.”).
37. See CALLAN, supra note 28, at 138–45; WILLIAM GALSTON, LIBERAL PLURALISM
101–09 (2002).
38. On education as a means of conscious social reproduction, see generally GUT-
MANN, supra note 28.
39. Of course, the state as educator may have interests other than the child’s intellec-
tual welfare.  On the mixed motives undergirding nineteenth century efforts to
regulate public schooling, see generally CARL F. KAESTLE, PILLARS OF THE REPUB-
LIC: COMMON SCHOOLS AND AMERICAN SOCIETY (1983); infra notes 101 and 102.
On the threat of state indoctrination in the public schools, see, for example, Ste-
phen Arons and Charles Lawrence III, The Manipulation of Consciousness:  A
First Amendment Critique of Schooling, 15 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 309 (1980);
George W. Dent, Jr., Of God and Caesar: The Free Exercise Rights of Public
School Students, 43 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 707 (1993); Robert D. Kamenshine, The
First Amendment’s Implied Political Establishment Clause, 67 CAL. L. REV. 1104
(1979); Nadine Stroessen, “Secular Humanism” and “Scientific Creationism”:
Proposed Standards for Reviewing Curricular Decisions Affecting Students’ Relig-
ious Freedom, 47 OHIO ST. L.J. 333 (1986); Mark G. Yudof, When Governments
Speak: Toward a Theory of Government Expression and the First Amendment, 57
TEX. L. REV. 863 (1979). But see, e.g., Stanley Ingber, Religious Children and the
Inevitable Compulsion of Public Schools, 43 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 773 (1993).
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No one would suggest that parents may not introduce their chil-
dren to personal sources of moral or religious meaning.40  However, to
those parents who want their children untouched by other points of
view, the state must say that the rights of parents, while profound,
are circumscribed—contingent, as the Supreme Court has always
noted, on preparing the young for the additional obligations they will
take on as members of a pluralistic society.41  “In a democracy,” politi-
cal theorist William Galston writes, “parents are entitled to introduce
their children to what they regard as vital sources of meaning and
value, and to hope that their children will come to share this orienta-
tion.”42  Yet, children have freestanding intellectual and moral claims
of their own, claims that Galston goes on to remind us, “imply enforce-
able rights of exit from the boundaries of community defined by their
parents.”43  If children are granted this right of exit, they must be able
to exercise it freely.  They must not be disempowered from making
their own intellectual and moral claims in the first place.  The state
has a duty to make sure they are not disempowered, and one of its
best resources to that end is public schooling.
The full capacity for individual choice is the presupposition of First
Amendment freedoms.  It is for this reason that the state has a strong
obligation to see that free choice is not strangled at its source.44  The
state may not sponsor particular religious or political beliefs, but that
is not enough; it must protect children from being forced to adopt par-
ticular religious or political beliefs.45  The state must work to protect
the moral and intellectual autonomy of all children.  Further, if the
state has the obligation to ensure the child’s opportunity to become
autonomous, that obligation, as educational theorist Harry Brighouse
has pointed out, “cuts against the differential regulation of public and
private schools with respect to religious instruction.”46  Children are
owed this obligation “regardless of whether it is the state, their par-
40. Cf. GALSTON, supra note 37, at 105.
41. See Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus & Mary, 268 U.S. 510,
535 (1925) (“The child is not the mere creature of the state; those who nurture
him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recog-
nize and prepare him for additional obligations.”), quoted in Troxel v. Granville,
530 U.S. 57, 79 (2000); Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989); Lehr v.
Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983); H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398 (1981); Belotti v.
Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979); Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979); Wisconsin v.
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
42. GALSTON, supra note 37, at 104.
43. Id.
44. See Ginsburg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 649 (1968) (Stewart, J., concurring in
the result).
45. See W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1944).
46. Harry Brighouse, School Vouchers, Separation of Church and State, and Personal
Autonomy, in MORAL AND POLITICAL EDUCATION 244, 247 (Stephen Macedo & Yael
Tamir eds., 2002).
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ents, or a religious foundation that pays for their education, and re-
gardless of whether they attend privately-run or government-run
schools.”47  The constitutional freedom to choose is not guaranteed
only to be so circumscribed that it exists in principle but not in fact.
The purpose of this Article is two-fold.  First, the Article argues
that the parent’s right to educate his or her children is strictly circum-
scribed by the parent’s duty to ensure that children learn habits of
critical reasoning and reflection.  The law has long recognized that the
state’s duty to educate children is superior to any parental right.  In-
deed, the “parentalist” position to the contrary rests on an inflation of
rights that is, in fact, a radical departure from longstanding legal
norms.  Indeed, at common law the parent had “a sacred right” to the
custody of his child,48 and the parent’s right to control the upbringing
of the child was “almost absolute.”49  The great legal authorities—Wil-
liam Blackstone, James Kent, and their scholarly successors—are
cited to this effect.50  Nevertheless, this reading of the law is sorely
anachronistic—less history than advocacy on behalf of parental
rights.  If “fundamental” describes rights with a deep historical pedi-
gree, the right to parent free of state interference cannot be numbered
among fundamental rights.  What is deeply rooted in our nation’s his-
tory is the notion that the state entrusts the parent with custody of the
child only so long as the parent meets his duty to take proper care of
the child.  Whether this authority is called a power or a right, it has
always been contingent on the welfare of the child and the needs of the
state.51  It has always been “in the nature of a trust, reposed in [the
47. Id.
48. See, e.g., Daniel E. Witte, Note, People v. Bennett: Analytic Approaches to Recog-
nizing a Fundamental Parental Right Under the Ninth Amendment, 1996 BYU L.
REV. 183, 190 (quoting In re Appeal in Maricopa County, Juv. Action No. J-75482,
536 P.2d 197, 206 (Ariz. 1975) (en banc)).
49. Jill Elaine Hasday, Parenthood Divided: A Legal History of the Bifurcated Law of
Parental Relations, 90 GEO. L.J. 299, 310 (2002).
50. Throughout this Article I use “common law” to refer to judge-made law, whether
formally derived at law or in equity.  On the early embrace of equitable principles
by American custody courts, see, for example, MICHAEL GROSSBERG, GOVERNING
THE HEARTH: LAW AND THE FAMILY IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 234–307
(1985); MARY ANN MASON, FROM FATHER’S PROPERTY TO CHILDREN’S RIGHTS 1–83
(1994).
51. Cf. Etna, 8 F. Cas. 803, 806 (D. Me. 1838) (No. 4,562) (“It may be true that the
paternal power is sometimes described in terms more general, for men who are
most accurate in the use of language, do not always, whether in speaking or writ-
ing, annex to a general truth all the limitations and qualifications with which it
is to be understood.  It is perfectly true, as a general proposition, that the father
has the right to the custody and control of the person of his child; and it is equally
true that if he abuses this power the law will interpose and take his child from
him.”).
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parent] by the State . . . , which may be extended or contracted as the
public welfare may require.”52
Second, the Article suggests that this trust principle—the notion
that the parent’s educational authority is bound by the parent’s peda-
gogical duty—may, first, help us better understand the doctrinal mod-
esty of the Court’s seminal “right to parent” cases, and, second, help
the courts approach some difficult types of cases in a more principled
way, especially cases involving the allocation of educational authority
in the public schools.  If the courts were to apply the principle that no
authority, public or private, may deny children exposure to the full
measure of intellectual incitement that should be the heart (and soul)
of every young person’s education, they would more consistently and
correctly sort out the competing claims of parents and public school
officials to make educational choices on behalf of the child.
Part II of this Article argues that at common law and, for most of
the nation’s history, under state statutory regimes, the authority of
the parent to direct the child’s upbringing was a matter of duty, not
right.  Chief among parental obligations was the duty to provide the
child with a suitable education.  Indeed, it was the child who pos-
sessed “a perfect right”:53 the right to proper parental care, including
the right to an education that would prepare the child for eventual
enfranchisement from the primary familial culture.  The scope of the
parent’s authority to direct the child’s education has always been lim-
ited, determined by the best interests of the child and the legitimate
needs of the state.  In the United States, custody courts created a com-
posite system that allowed the state as parens patriae to regulate fam-
ily relations, but as a general matter entrusted parents with the task
of providing the child a proper education.
Part III looks at the Supreme Court’s seminal cases establishing a
parent’s right to educate: Meyer v. Nebraska54 and Pierce v. Society of
Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus and Mary.55  Commonly read to
state broad claims about the fundamental nature of parental rights,
these cases stand for a much more modest proposition: the state does
not have exclusive authority over the child’s education and, more par-
ticularly, the state cannot prohibit parents from teaching their chil-
dren subject matter outside the scope of the state-mandated
curriculum.  Fearful that the state was claiming exclusive power to
educate children, the seminal Supreme Court parenting cases sought
to restore the composite character of educational authority over the
52. CHRISTOPHER G. TIEDEMAN, A TREATISE ON THE LIMITATIONS OF POLICE POWER IN
THE UNITED STATES 553 (St. Louis, Da Capo Press 1886).
53. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 435 (Oxford,
Clarendon Press 1765).
54. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
55. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
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child.  Rhetoric aside, Meyer and Pierce are hardly a charter of funda-
mental parental rights.
Part IV considers several types of cases that involve the allocation
of educational authority within the public schools.  While a full treat-
ment of these cases lies outside the scope of the Article, this Part sug-
gests that courts should look with skepticism at any educational
program—whether imposed by the parent or by the state—that, by
restricting the spectrum of available knowledge, fails to prepare the
child for obligations beyond those of familial obedience.
In Meyer v. Nebraska, Arthur Mullen stood before the Supreme
Court to argue against the power of the state “to take the child from
the parent.”56  He denounced “the principle of the soviet” that made
the state superior to the family.57  No state, Mullen argued, should
“prescribe the mental bill of fare” that the child will follow.58  He
would not accept, and neither would the Court, that the child is not
the parent’s to begin with, and certainly not the mere recipient of
whatever mental bill of fare is prescribed by the parent.  Yet, surpris-
ingly, the law of parent-relations, as developed by the American
courts, did understand that, in the words of John Locke, the child
must “grow up to the use of reason”59 and that if he is not the mere
creature of the state, he is more than a placid reflection of the parental
image.  In short, the history of custody cases testifies to the enduring
belief that the child is born to intellectual and moral freedom.
II. PARENTING AND EDUCATION: THE SACRED TRUST
The right to parent—that is, the right to parent as a constitutional
guarantee—is based on the most fragile of historical and doctrinal
foundations.  The Supreme Court has echoed the popular assumption
that the right of parents to make decisions concerning the care, cus-
tody, and control of their children is a fundamental, time-honored
one.60  However, no Supreme Court holding directly supports this
claim.61  Justice Scalia has correctly observed that there is little sup-
56. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 17, at 10.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. JOHN LOCKE, SOME THOUGHTS CONCERNING EDUCATION 110 (John W. Yolton &
Jean S. Yolton eds., Oxford University Press 1989) (1693).
60. The right to parent is “perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests
recognized by this Court.”  Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 64 (2000).  “[W]e have
recognized the fundamental right of parents to make decisions concerning the
care, custody, and control of their children.”  Id. at 66.
61. Though the Troxel Court stated that parents have a fundamental right to direct
the upbringing of their children, it did not identify the appropriate standard of
review.  Concurring in the judgment, Justice Thomas argued for strict scrutiny,
the level of judicial scrutiny that would apply in cases involving fundamental
rights. Id. at 80 (Thomas, J., concurring).  In Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205,
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port for the notion that the right to parent is a “substantive constitu-
tional right,” let alone a fundamental one: “Only three holdings of this
Court rest in whole or in part upon a substantive constitutional right
of parents to direct the upbringing of their children—two of them from
an era rich in substantive due process holdings that have since been
repudiated.”62  The mixed doctrinal history of rights of parents cuts
across traditional political lines.  On one hand, that this right to par-
ent is the product of judicial activism—specifically, a brand of judicial
activism that would set the stage for a new era of privacy rights—does
not deter conservative advocates of parental rights from celebrating
the court cases that rested on this basis.  On the other hand, that this
right was the product of a Lochner-era constitutionalism bent on de-
limiting the police powers of the state—indeed, the product of a natu-
ral law anti-statism that would strike down basic health and safety
protections for children—does not much bother liberal advocates of
parental rights.  Thus, it appears that, to advocates on both sides of
the political spectrum, the privilege of parenting trumps concerns
about doctrinal consistency or principle.
Though the Court has used loose language63 about the fundamen-
tal right of parents to rear their children, the fact is that the “right to
parent,” even in its more discrete guises—such as a right to direct the
education or religious upbringing of children—has always been made
to subserve the best interests of the child and the legitimate interests
of the state.  Like the parenting right in general, the right to educate
is assumed to belong to the ages, to be a foundational pillar of the
common law and a bedrock principle of our constitutional order.  This
assumption rests more on wish fulfillment than on a careful reading of
the common law tradition or the relevant case law.  The doctrine’s sur-
233 (1972), the Court stated that “when the interests of parenthood are combined
with a free exercise claim of the nature revealed by this record, more than merely
a ‘reasonable relation to some purpose within the competency of the State’ is re-
quired to sustain the validity of the State’s requirement under the First Amend-
ment.”  The right of religious parenting may thus be construed as a “hybrid”
claim subject to strict scrutiny. See Employment Div., Dep’t of Human Res. v.
Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879, 881–82 (1990) (“The only decisions in which we have
held that the First Amendment bars application of a neutral, generally applicable
law to religiously motivated action have involved not the Free Exercise Clause
alone, but the Free Exercise Clause in conjunction with other constitutional
protections . . . .”).
62. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 92 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S.
205 (1972); Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus & Mary, 268 U.S.
510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
63. Imprecise language regarding parents’ fundamental rights has led to inconsistent
lower court decisions. See generally Jeffrey Shulman, What Yoder Wrought: Re-
ligious Disparagement, Parental Alienation, and the Best Interests of the Child,
53 VILL. L. REV. 173 (2008).
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vival speaks to a yearning for control, for something that is “mine.”64
It evokes a time when parents could tell the state to mind its own
business and when the family was a private place where parents could
build a bulwark against the loss of control that accompanies unset-
tling social change.65  However, nostalgia aside, there never existed
such a time.  The state has always claimed that the parent–child rela-
tion is subject to ordinary municipal regulations.  One nineteenth cen-
tury court put it quite succinctly: “There is no parental authority
independent of the supreme power of the state.”66
A. Doctrinal Beginnings
In 1925, the same year the Supreme Court decided Pierce, the
Court of Errors and Appeals of New Jersey heard a dispute in which
the maternal grandparents of John Lippincott sought to obtain cus-
tody of their grandson for a portion of the year.67  Prior to his death,
John’s father executed a writing in which he delegated John’s custody
to his parents.68  There was no question about the fitness of either the
paternal or the maternal grandparents.69  The only question was
whether the chancery court, which had granted the maternal grand-
parents custody for two months a year, had jurisdiction over the mat-
ter—whether, in the absence of any question of fitness, the chancery
court had the power to order John’s parents, against the wishes of the
child’s father, to share custody of the child.70  In the words of the ap-
pellate court, “the essential inquiry presented is whether, exercising
its judgment as parens patriae in behalf of the state, the court of chan-
cery, intent alone upon promoting the best interests of the infant, may
in the situation confide [John’s] custody for two months of the year to
his maternal grandparents.”71  This was a question of obvious impor-
tance to the court, “comprehending as it does the extent of the chan-
cery jurisdiction in a cause of this character,”72 and it led the court to
64. But see GALSTON, supra note 37, at 103 (“Everyone can agree that children are
not the ‘property’ of their parents.  Still, when I say that the child is ‘mine,’ I am
both acknowledging responsibilities and asserting authority beyond what I owe
or claim vis-a`-vis children in general.  As parent, I am more than the child’s care-
taker or teacher, and I am not simply a representative of the state delegated to
prepare the child for citizenship.”).
65. Or, when a father could take his children on an adventurous boat trip in lieu of
having them attend compulsory health education classes. See infra text accom-
panying notes 358–69.
66. Mercein v. People ex rel. Barry, 25 Wend. 64, 103 (N.Y. 1840).
67. Lippincott v. Lippincott, 128 A. 254 (N.J. 1925).
68. Id. at 254.
69. Id. at 255.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 265 (emphasis added).
72. Id.
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consider the nature and scope of state power to interfere in custody
disputes.
The court began its inquiry by stating that “the touchstone of our
jurisprudence in matters dealing with the custody and control of in-
fants is the welfare and happiness of the infant.”73  The best interests
of the child were the court’s paramount consideration, “not the final
affections naturally arising from parental or family relationship.”74
Citing case law that went back to 1840, the court went on to explain
that because the child’s welfare was the judiciary’s primary concern in
custody cases, “it has been quite generally held that even the natural
right of the father to the custody of his child cannot be treated as an
absolute property right.”75  Rather, the right of the father to custody
of the child should be thought of “as a trust reposed in the father by
the state, as parens patriae for the welfare of the infant.”76  This no-
tion of parenting as a trust was a longstanding principle of the com-
mon law.77  The court surveyed the history of state efforts to control
the upbringing of children, and concluded, “ ‘The power of the court to
intervene for the protection of the infant was not the creature of stat-
ute, but is an inherent power in the court derived from the common
law.’”78  In deciding to hear the case, in other words, the court was
merely affirming well-settled principles of custody law.79
The Lippincott court observed how some countries “considered the
child as a charge of the state,”80 while others “conceded to the father
absolute dominion over the child.”81  The court would not take its cue
from either of these approaches.  Rather, the court looked to English
and American common law, which conceded absolute control of the
child to neither parent nor state.  For the court, “[t]he English com-
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. (citing Mercein v. People ex rel. Barry, 25 Wend. 64 (N.Y. 1840)).
76. Id. (emphasis added).
77. See id. at 255.
78. Id. (citing People ex rel.  Barry v. Mercein, 8 Paige Ch. 47, 53 (N.Y. Ch. 1839),
rev’d, 3 Hill 399 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1842)).
79. The court cited In re Nicoll, 1 Johns. Ch. 25 (N.Y. Ch. 1814) (“[T]his Court has the
care and protection of infants during their minority.”); People ex rel. Barry v.
Mercein, 8 Paige Ch. 47, 53 (N.Y. Ch. 1839), rev’d, 3 Hill 399 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1842)
(“[T]he power of the chancellor to issue a habeas corpus is not derived solely from
the statute, but is also an inherent power in the court, derived from the common
law . . . .”).
80. 128 A. at 255. (“Greece, Egypt, Persia, and the ancient civilizations generally . . .
considered the child as a charge of the state, which after early infancy took the
child into its control and educated him throughout youth, in the manners, cus-
toms, traditions, and laws of the state, emphasizing in the curriculum loyalty to
the state as the first consideration from the child.”).
81. Id. (“The early Roman law, on the other hand, conceded to the father absolute
dominion over the child, including the power of death as a corrective.”).
\\server05\productn\N\NEB\89-2\NEB204.txt unknown Seq: 16 15-NOV-10 12:09
2010] THE PARENT AS (MERE) EDUCATIONAL TRUSTEE 305
mon law . . . presented a composite system,”82 one that, “within rea-
sonable limitations, conceded to the parent absolute control, subject to
the power of the King, as parens patriae, to control the infantile status
in the interest of the child, as well as in the interest of the state.”83
Such a composite system, which according to the court was the basis
for American cases as well,84 allowed the state as parens patriae to
regulate family relations, but as a general matter did not expect the
state to “assum[e] the Spartan role of absolute possession of the infant
in the interest of the state.”85
For the most part, the Lippincott court got it right.  The Lippincott
court correctly contrasted the composite system of English and Ameri-
can custody law with monopolistic legal regimes, both those that give
the state “absolute possession” of the child (a Spartan regime) and
those that give the father “absolute dominion” (a Roman regime).  The
court stumbled a bit when it described the authority of the parent as
absolute “within reasonable limitations.”86  In fact, the common-law
tradition was one that treated paternal absolutism and its rights foun-
dation—that is, the idea that the parent had a proprietary interest in
the child—as barbaric.87
For William Blackstone, the parent is only entrusted with custody
of the child.  This trust makes sense because, as the common law
presumes, the natural affection of the parent will lead him to take
care of his child.  Nonetheless, the law is not content to leave the child
at the mercy of the parent’s good nature.  The civil law obliges the
parent to provide for the child, imposing upon the parent the duties of
maintenance, protection, and education.  To enable the parent better
to meet these obligations, the law provides the parent with a set of
legal privileges—that is, with the instruments of power the parent
82. Id.
83. Id. (emphasis added).
84. Id.
85. Id.; cf. GUTMANN, supra note 28, at 32 (“There is no simple solution to the tension
between the freedom of parents and the welfare of children.  The state may not
grant parents absolute authority over their children’s education in the name of
individual freedom, nor may it claim exclusive educational authority in the name
of communal solidarity.”).
86. Id.
87. See State v. Clottu, 33 Ind. 409, 411 (Ind. 1870) (“The duties and authority per-
taining to the relation of parent and child have their foundations in nature, it is
true.  Nevertheless, all civilized governments have regarded this relation as fall-
ing within the legitimate scope of legislative control.  Except in countries which
lie in barbarism, the authority of the parent over the child is nowhere left abso-
lutely without municipal definition and regulation.”); People ex rel. Barry v.
Mercein, 3 Hill 399 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1842) (“Those countries in which the father has
a general power to dispose of his children, have always been considered barba-
rous.  Our own law never has allowed the exercise of such power except for some
specific and temporary purpose, such as apprenticeship during the father’s life, or
guardianship after his death.”).
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will use to direct the upbringing of the child.  However, the power of
the parent is solely derived from the duties owed to the child.  If the
parent fails to meet these obligations, the state will take custody of
the child; indeed, if need be, the state will entrust some third party
with custody.  For Blackstone, state regulation of parental custody is
entirely consistent with the common-law principle that parental au-
thority is contingent on parental responsibility.  His is hardly a por-
trait of the parent–child relation drawn in absolutist strokes.
In his Commentaries on the Laws of England, Blackstone breaks
his discussion of parent–child relations into three sections: 1) the du-
ties of parents to their children, 2) the power of parents over their
children, and 3) the duties of children to their parents.88  The order of
this discussion testifies to the principle that parental will is bounded
by parental obligation.  As Blackstone says, “The power of parents
over their children is derived from . . . their duty.”89  In effect, paren-
tal authority is a civil stipend earned by the parent.  The power of the
parent enables him “more effectually to perform his duty,” and it
serves “partly as a recompense for his care and trouble in the faithful
discharge of it.”90  Blackstone discusses three types of parental duty:
maintenance, protection, and education.  The duty to provide mainte-
nance is “a principle of natural law,”91 but it is also premised on the
core principles of contract law.  By begetting children, the parent has
voluntarily assumed this obligation.92  Thus, it is the child who has
rights—children have what Blackstone calls “a perfect right” to main-
tenance from their parents.93  That right will be enforced by law.  Nat-
ural affection should ensure that parents fulfill their obligations, but
the municipal laws of the state provide a more failsafe enforcement
88. See BLACKSTONE, supra note 53, at 434–42.
89. Id. at 440; see also 2 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 203 (Boston,
Little, Brown & Co., O.W. Holmes, Jr. ed., 12th ed. 1873) (1851) (“The rights of
parents result from their duties.”).
90. BLACKSTONE, supra note 53, at 440; see also KENT, supra note 89, at 228–30 (ob-
serving that the father is entitled to value of his child’s labor and services “in
consequence of” parental obligations).
91. BLACKSTONE, supra note 53, at 435.
92. Id. (“The duty of parents to provide for the maintenance of their children is a
principle of natural law; an obligation . . . laid on them not only by nature herself,
but by their own proper act, in bringing them into the world: for they would be in
the highest manner injurious to their issue, if they only gave the children life,
that they might afterwards see them perish.  By begetting them therefore they
have entered into a voluntary obligation, to endeavor, as far as in them lies, that
the life which they have bestowed shall be supported and preserved.”).
93. Id. at 435 (“[T]he children will have the perfect right of receiving maintenance
from their parents.”); cf.  HOCHHEIMER, supra note 1, at 22 (“The terms ‘right’ and
‘claim,’ when used in this connection, according to their proper meaning, virtually
import the right or claim of the child to be in that custody or charge which will
subserve its real interests.”).
\\server05\productn\N\NEB\89-2\NEB204.txt unknown Seq: 18 15-NOV-10 12:09
2010] THE PARENT AS (MERE) EDUCATIONAL TRUSTEE 307
mechanism.  If the parent fails to do his duty, “judex de ea re cognoscet
[the judge will take notice of it].”94
Blackstone discusses the duty of protection briefly95 before he
moves on to the duty he considers “of far the greatest importance of
any,” that of providing an education suitable to the child’s station in
life.96  Here, too, the common law operates on the principle that the
parent has obligated himself voluntarily.  Having brought a child into
the world, the parent does the child little good “if he afterwards en-
tirely neglects his culture and education.”97  Blackstone observes that
the municipal laws of most states are inadequate in this regard, “by
not constraining the parent to bestow a proper education upon his
children.”98  He does not exempt the laws of England from this gen-
eral censure,99 but he takes evident pride in the fact that under En-
glish law the children of the poor are taken out of the hands of their
parents and, for their good and the good of the state, are bound to
apprenticeships.
Our laws, though their defects in this particular cannot be denied, have in one
instance made a wise provision for breeding up the rising generation; since
the poor and laborious part of the community, when past the age of nurture,
are taken out of the hands of their parents, by the statutes for apprenticing
poor children; and are placed out by the public in such a manner, as may
render their abilities, in their several stations, of the greatest advantage to
the commonwealth.100
This “wise provision” of binding children to third parties would be the
state’s basic child welfare instrument in the eighteenth and nine-
teenth centuries.  These measures are, no doubt, suspect to a modern
temperament, reflecting, as they do, historical prejudices about class
and ethnicity.101  Still, they also reflect a genuine concern for the wel-
94. BLACKSTONE, supra note 53, at 435.
95. Id. at 438 (“From the duty of maintenance we may easily pass to that of protec-
tion; which is also a natural duty, but rather permitted than enjoined by any
municipal laws: nature, in this respect, working so strongly as to need rather a
check than a spur.”).
96. Id.




101. On the history of common education as reflecting historical prejudices, see gener-
ally, SAMUEL BOYLES & HERBERT GINTIS, SCHOOLING IN CAPITALIST AMERICA: EDU-
CATIONAL REFORM AND THE CONTRADICTION OF ECONOMIC LIFE (1976); MICHAEL B.
KATZ, THE IRONY OF EARLY SCHOOL REFORM: EDUCATIONAL INNOVATION IN MID-
NINETEENTH CENTURY MASSACHUSETTS (1968); ANTHONY PLATT, THE CHILD SAV-
ERS: THE INVENTION OF DELINQUENCY (1969); DAVID J. ROTHMAN, THE DISCOVERY
OF THE ASYLUM: SOCIAL ORDER AND DISORDER IN THE NEW REPUBLIC (1971); DAVID
TYACK, THE ONE BEST SYSTEM: A HISTORY OF URBAN EDUCATION (1974). But see
generally DIANE RAVITCH, THE REVISIONISTS REVISTED: A CRITIQUE OF THE RADI-
CAL ATTACK ON THE SCHOOLS (1978).
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fare of disadvantaged children.102  Moreover, they illustrate the im-
portant common law understanding that the welfare of children is a
matter of deep public concern, linked closely to the general welfare of
the state.  In separating child from parent, the apprenticeship laws
treated children as a public good, one that, like other public goods,
should be managed to “the greatest advantage to the commonwealth.”
Because it derives from the duty entrusted to him, the power of the
parent is only as great as is needed to secure the child’s welfare.
Blackstone observes that, though sufficient to keep a child in order,
“the power of a parent by our English laws is much more moderate”
than that prescribed by the municipal law of other nations.103  He re-
jects a “very large and absolute authority” for the parent,104 insisting
that the parent may “lawfully correct his child,” but only “in a reason-
able manner.”105  Correction must be “for the benefit of [the child’s]
education,”106 and it must serve the child, not the will of the parent.
The legal power of the parent is finite in duration as well as scope, for
it is directed toward the eventual enfranchisement of the child, the
point when “the empire of the father . . . gives place to the empire of
reason.”107  The child is enfranchised “by arriving at years of discre-
tion.”108  This is why the parent’s duty to provide the child with a suit-
able education is so important.  The parent has no right to suffer a
child “to grow up like a mere beast, to lead a life useless to others, and
shameful to himself.”109  Rather, it is the parent’s duty to encourage
the discretion that is the signpost to the child’s enfranchisement.
With regard to a child’s estate, Blackstone states, “A father has no
other power . . . than as his trustee or guardian; for, though he may
receive the profits during the child’s minority, yet he must account for
them when he comes of age.”110  It is with regard to the child’s moral
and intellectual estate—that is, the child’s psychological and emo-
tional development—that the principle of parent as trustee would
have its greatest resonance.111  For American jurists and legal schol-
ars, the principle that the parent serves the child, providing the child
a “due education” as preparation for his enfranchisement, is the foun-
102. On nineteenth century child welfare efforts as “a complex and highly ambivalent
affair,” see, for example, Sanford J. Fox, Juvenile Justice Reform: An Historical
Perspective, 22 STAN. L. REV. 1187, 1187–230 (1970).
103. BLACKSTONE, supra note 53, at 440.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.; cf. KENT, supra note 89, at 254.
107. BLACKSTONE, supra note 53, at 441.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 439.
110. Id. at 441.
111. Cf. JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 325 (Peter Laslett ed., 1988)
(1689) (“[W]hen he comes to the Estate that made his Father a Freeman, the son
is a Freeman too.”).
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dation of parental authority.  According to James Kent, the duty to
provide for the maintenance and education of the child is “a sacred
trust,”112 and it is thus the true foundation of parental power.113  The
parent is “absolutely bound” to serve the child.114  Similarly, for Jo-
seph Story, parents are only “intrusted with the custody of the persons
and the education of their children” and only so long as they properly
take care of the child.
For, though in general, parents are intrusted with the custody of the persons
and the education of their children; yet this is done upon the natural pre-
sumption, that the children will be properly taken care of, and will be brought
up with a due education in literature, and morals, and religion; and that they
will be treated with kindness and affection.  But, whenever this presumption
is removed . . . in every such case, the Court of Chancery will interfere, and
deprive him of the custody of his children, and appoint a suitable person to act
as guardian, and take care of them, and superintend their education.115
For Lewis Hochheimer, whose legal treatise on child custody was a
common reference for the courts, the result of the case law was “an
utter repudiation of the notion, that there can be such a thing as a
proprietary right of interest in or to the custody of an infant.”116
Hochheimer notes that “the general drift of opinion is in the direction
of treating the idea of trust as the controlling principle in all contro-
versies in relation to such custody.117
On the controlling principle of the parent as trustee, the courts of
the United States would construct doctrine that made the rights of the
parent subordinate to those of the child and the interests of the
state.118  The doctrinal structure was built on the following premises:
112. KENT, supra note 89, at 252.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 227.
115. 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE 574–75 (Boston, Hil-
liard, Gray & Co. 1836).  The courts still act upon this presumption. See Parham
v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979) (“The law’s concept of the family rests on a pre-
sumption that parents possess what a child lacks in maturity, experience, and
capacity for judgment required for making life’s difficult decisions.  More impor-
tant, historically it has recognized that natural bonds of affection lead parents to
act in the best interests of their children.”).
116. HOCHHEIMER, supra note 1, at 22 (“The general result of the American cases may
be characterized as an utter repudiation of the notion, that there can be such a
thing as a proprietary right of interest in or to the custody of an infant.”); cf.
ERNST FREUND, THE POLICE POWER: PUBLIC POLICY AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
248 (1904) (describing the “tendency to treat [the right to parent] altogether as a
power in trust, which may not only be checked in the case of manifest abuse, but
the exercise of which may be directed by such rules as the legislature may estab-
lish as best calculated to promote the welfare of the child”).
117. HOCHHEIMER, supra note 1, at 22.
118. For a modern defense of the trust principle, see JAMES G. DWYER, RELIGIOUS
SCHOOLS V. CHILDREN’S RIGHTS 62–101 (1998) (arguing that the law should grant
parents only a legal privilege to care for children in ways consistent with their
best temporal interests); Richard Arneson & Ian Shapiro, Democratic Autonomy
and Religious Freedom: A Critique of Wisconsin v. Yoder, in DEMOCRACY’S PLACE
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1. The child has independent interests.  The conception that un-
derlies the status of minors at common law, according to
Hochheimer, “is that of the separate legal personality of the
child . . . .  From the very moment of birth a child becomes a citizen,
or subject of the government under whose jurisdiction born, enti-
tled to the protection of that government.”119  The individual child,
not the family, is the legal unit with which the law must deal.120
The right of custody belongs to the child—it is “the right or claim of
the child to be in that custody or charge which will subserve its
real interests.”121
137, 138 (Ian Shapiro ed., 1996) (stating that “the relationship between parents
and children is best thought of as one of trusteeship”); cf. Barbara Bennett Wood-
house, Hatching the Egg: A Child-Centered Perspective on Parents’ Rights, 14
CARDOZO L. REV. 1747, 1755 (1993) (viewing parenthood as stewardship); Ira C.
Lupu, Home Education, Religious Liberty, and the Separation of Powers, 67 B.U.
L. REV. 971, 976–77 (1987) (“The legal tradition of authorizing parents to speak
for their offspring need not become a device by which children are made to disap-
pear.  Children, not fully competent to make decisions because of insufficient
awareness of the decisions’ long-term consequences, are normally subject to pa-
rental control.  Parents are presumptively trustworthy decisionmakers for their
children because parents generally feel affection for their young and are knowl-
edgeable about their interests.  Custodial power of this sort is never absolute,
however, for it is based on a theory of fiduciary obligation.  If the custodian mis-
treats his ward, public or private remedies designed to protect the child may be
available.”). See generally Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Scott, Parents as Fidu-
ciaries, 81 VA. L. REV. 2401, 2401–02 (1994) (characterizing parents as
fiduciaries).
119. HOCHEIMER, supra note 1, at 2; cf. Etna, 8 F. Cas. 803, 806 (D. Me. 1838) (No.
4,562) (“As soon as a child is born, he becomes a member of the human family,
and is invested with all the rights of humanity.”); MICHAEL GROSSBERG, GOV-
ERNING THE HEARTH: LAW AND THE FAMILY IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 304
(1985) (“Perhaps the most enduring product of the distinctive domestic-relations
law hammered out in nineteenth-century America was the legal concept of the
family as a collection of separate legal individuals rather than an organic part of
the body politic.  This occurred at the expense of traditional notions of parental
sovereignty and household legal unity.”).
120. HOCHEIMER, supra note 1, at 2 n.3.  Hochheimer notes the contrast with the Ro-
man legal system, under which “the identity of the child was merged in that of
the family.” See id. at 2 n.3; see also Etna, 8 F. Cas. at 804 (stating that courts
should not award fathers “something like that pree¨minent and sovereign author-
ity which has never been admitted by the jurisprudence of any civilized people,
except that of ancient Rome, whose law held children to be the property of the
father, and placed them in relation to him in the category of things instead of that
of persons”).
121. HOCHEIMER, supra note 1, at 22; cf., e.g., Legate v. Legate, 28 S.W. 281, 282 (Tex.
1984) (“The law recognizes the parent as the natural guardian of, and entitled to
the custody of, his minor child, so long as he discharges the obligation imposed
upon him by social and civil law, of protecting and maintaining his offspring.  It
does not, however, recognize in him any property interest in his child, but merely
accords to him the benefits resulting from the child’s services during minority,
and such probable benefits as may result to him thereafter, in return for the
tender care, the anxious solicitude, and the physical, mental, and moral training
\\server05\productn\N\NEB\89-2\NEB204.txt unknown Seq: 22 15-NOV-10 12:09
2010] THE PARENT AS (MERE) EDUCATIONAL TRUSTEE 311
2. The state has an independent interest in the welfare of the
child.  Parental authority to control the child is constrained by the
assumption that “children are not born for the benefit of the par-
ents alone, but for the country.”122
3. The state has inherent and plenary power to legislate on behalf
of the child.123  The interest of the state in children is so broad “as
to almost defy limitations.”124
4. The power of the state to secure the child’s welfare is superior
to parental “rights” to control the child.125
5. The state may entrust its power to a parent or guardian.  The
state delegates its power because it does not possess the “requisite
knowledge” necessary to care for the child.126  The state presumes
that the parent will fulfill the duties owed to the child.127  “There is
no parental authority independent of the supreme power of the
state.”128  All parental power and authority over children is a mere
delegated function.129
6. The authority of the parent is “inseparably connected with the
parental obligations, and arises out them.”130  This authority “is
not a power granted to the parent for his benefit, but allowed to
him for the benefit of the child.”131
bestowed by the parent, as well as the pecuniary and social benefits derived by
the child from the parent. . . .  The right of the parent or the state to surround the
child with proper influences is of a governmental nature, while the right of the
child to be surrounded by such influences as will best promote its physical,
mental, and moral development is an inherent right, of which, when once ac-
quired, it cannot be lawfully deprived.”) (emphasis added).
122. JOEL PRENTISS BISHOP, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE
517–18 (Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1852).
123. See, e.g., Allison v. Bryan, 97 P. 282, 286 (Okla. 1908) (“A child is primarily a
ward of the state. The sovereign has the inherent power to legislate for its wel-
fare, and to place it with either parent at will, or take it from both parents and to
place it elsewhere.”).
124. In re Lippincott, 124 A. 532, 533 (N.J. Ch. 1924), aff’d, 128 A. 254 (1925).
125. See, e.g., State v. Bailey, 61 N.E. 730, 731–32 (Ind. 1901) (“The natural rights of a
parent to the custody and control of his infant child are subordinate to the power
of the state, and may be restricted and regulated by municipal laws.”).
126. Mercein v. People ex rel.  Barry, 25 Wend. 64, 103 (N.Y. 1840).
127. See, e.g., STORY, supra note 115.
128. Mercein, 25 Wend. at 103.
129. HOCHHEIMER, supra note 1, at 4.
130. Cf. Etna, 8 F. Cas. 803, 804 (D. Me. 1838) (No. 4,562).
131. Id.
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7. That power is revocable by the state;132 it is “subject to such
restrictions and limitations as the sovereign power of the nation
thinks proper to prescribe.”133
8. Because the control of children by parents “is subject to the
unlimited supervisory control of the state,”134  it is the sole prov-
ince of the legislature to determine how far to regulate or restrict
the authority of the parent.  On the matter of parent–child  rela-
tions, “[t]he judiciary has no authority to interfere with the exer-
cise of legislative judgment.”135
9. In the absence of any statutory mandates, the custody of chil-
dren “must always be regulated by judicial discretion, exercised in
reference to their best interests.”136
10. The parent owes a duty not only to the child, but to the state
as well.137
Under this composite system, the parent’s control of the child was
far from absolute.  The parent was entitled to the custody of his chil-
132. See, e.g., Mercein, 25 Wend. at 103; STORY, supra note 115.
133. Mercein, 25 Wend. at 103.
134. State v. Shorey, 86 P. 881, 882 (Or. 1906) (Minors are “wards of the state and
subject to its control.  As to them the state stands in the position of parens pa-
triae and may exercise unlimited supervision and control over their contracts,
occupation, and conduct, and the liberty and right of those who assume to deal
with them.  This is a power which inheres in the government for its own preser-
vation and for the protection of the life, person, health, and morals of its future
citizens.”); see also HOCHHEIMER, supra note 1, at 2 (“The only limitations upon
the governmental power are those resulting from the obligation towards the in-
fant himself. . . .”).
135. See, e.g., State v. Clottu, 33 Ind. 409, 412 (Ind. 1870) (“The subject [of par-
ent–child  relations] has always been regarded as within the purview of legisla-
tive authority.  How far this interference should extend is a question, not of
constitutional power for the courts, but of expediency and propriety, which it is
the sole province of the legislature to determine.  The judiciary has no authority
to interfere with this exercise of legislative judgment; and to do so would be to
invade the province which by the constitution is assigned exclusively to the law
making power.”); infra text accompanying notes 209–12.
136. Mercein, 25 Wend. at 101; cf., e.g., HOCHHEIMER, supra note 1, at 24 (“[I]n the
determination of every case affecting the custody of a child, the child’s welfare is
the paramount consideration.”).
137. See, e.g., Kelley v. Ferguson, 95 Neb. 63, 72, 144 N.W. 1039, 1044 (Neb. 1914)
(stating that the parent’s duty to educate is “owe[d] not only to the child but to
the commonwealth”); cf. KENT, supra note 89, at 233 (“A parent who sends his son
into the world uneducated, and without skill in any art or science, does a great
injury to mankind, as well as to his own family, for he defrauds the community of
a useful citizen, and bequeaths to it a nuisance.”).
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dren and to the value of their labor and services.138  He was entitled to
the benefit of the child’s labor “in order the better to discharge his
duty.”139  In custody cases, the courts did not automatically defer to
the claims of the parent.  They would “act according to sound discre-
tion,” even consulting the child “if it be of sufficiently mature age to
judge for itself.”140  Of course, the presumption that a parent would
act in the child’s best interests was a strong one, and in the absence of
effective welfare and educational bureaucracies, the state would con-
tinue to depend on the “insuperable . . . affection” that, according to
Blackstone, nature had implanted in every parent’s breast.141
Returning to In re Lippincott, the Court of Errors and Appeals of
New Jersey decided that the chancery court was right: it was in young
John Lippincott’s best interests to spend two months a year with his
maternal grandparents.142  The appellate court reasoned that even
though John’s father had assigned custody to the paternal grandpar-
ents, denying visitation to the maternal grandparents was not in “the
manifest interest of the child”—which, for the court, was “the material
and only ground for judicial interposition.”143  Sometimes, poetry
trumps formalism, even where the supposedly sacred and absolute
right of the father to the custody of the child is concerned.  For,
whatever else might be said about the manifest interest of John Lip-
pincott, it was certainly not a prosaic one: “[A]s if by an ordinance of
nature,” the court wrote, “the companionship of parental old age
brings to the confiding nature of roseate youth the balmy benediction
of an expiring day, the mellow and indelible memories of a family re-
cessional.”144  Yet, there was more than sentiment at work here.  The
chancery court acknowledged, as the paternal grandparents con-
tended, that there was no “appreciable difference in the material ad-
vantages” that the parties were able to give John.145  There were,
however, other advantages that John would never know.  He would
never know “that devotion and love that is materially fostered by the
association of one with those in whose affection he should hold a prom-
138. See BLACKSTONE, supra note 53, at 441 (“[The father] may indeed have the benefit
of his children’s labour while they live with him, and are maintained by him: but
this is no more than he is entitled to from his apprentices or servants.”).
139. Id.
140. KENT, supra note 89, at 231; see also HOCHHEIMER, supra note 1, at 54–59 (“In
certain cases . . . special regard is had to the wishes of children in any degree
capable of forming or expressing a choice.”).  On the rule of “infant discretion,”
see, for example, GROSSBERG, supra note 119, at 259 n.56 (listing cases); Jamil S.
Zainaldin, The Emergence of a Modern American Family Law: Child Custody,
Adoption, and the Courts, 1796–1851, 73 NW. U. L. REV. 1038 (1979).
141. See BLACKSTONE, supra note 53, at 435.
142. Lippincott v. Lippincott, 128 A. 254, 256 (N.J. 1925).
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. In re Lippincott, 124 A. 532, 533 (N.J. Ch. 1924), aff’d, 128 A. 254 (1925).
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inent place.”146  When the court considered John’s best interests, it
weighed that devotion and love, and decided that John’s father, re-
gardless of fitness, did not get to dictate the boy’s happiness.147  The
appellate court agreed, taking a similarly broad view of the child’s
welfare: “That it will be for the material and moral interests of the
child in its parental isolation to know and enjoy the affection and love
of its mother’s people will be conceded by all who are so fortunate as to
be able to revive the delectable memories of a youth so placed.”148
Where a sense of parental duty did not press parents to pursue the
child’s best interests, it was the duty of the court to do so.149  In the
words of the chancery court, “the day has long since passed when the
rights of infants to be properly nurtured are subordinate to the strict
legal rights of parents.”150
B. The Revolutionary Family
In 1855, in Herman v. State, the Supreme Court of Indiana decided
that the state’s liquor act, which prohibited the manufacture, sale,
and use of assorted liquors, was in violation of the state constitu-
tion.151  The court rejected the argument that the law was justified by
the principle “that you shall so use your own as not to injure an-
146. Id.  Some modern courts have reached a similar conclusion, albeit in a more pro-
saic fashion. See, e.g., Bishop v. Piller, 637 A.2d 976, 978–79 (Pa. 1994) (“It must
be remembered that grandchildren, too, have the natural right to know their
grandparents and that they benefit greatly from that relationship.  Grandparents
give love unconditionally—without entanglement with authority or discipline,
and often without pressures of other burdensome responsibilities.  Children de-
rive a greater sense of worthwhileness from grandparental attention and better
see their place in the continuum of family history.  Wisdom is imparted that can
be attained nowhere else.”).
147. Lippincott, 124 A. at 533; cf. In re Waldron, 13 Johns. 418, 420 (N.Y. 1816) (ruling
that “it will be more for the benefit of the child to remain with her grandparents
than to be put under the care . . . of her father”). But cf. Troxel v. Granville, 530
U.S. 57 (2000) (striking down state visitation statute as unconstitutional in-
fringement on parental rights).
148. Lippincott, 128 A. at 256.
149. See Lippincott, 124 A. at 533 (“In a controversy over [a child’s] possession, its
welfare will be the paramount consideration in controlling the discretion of the
court.  The strict right of the parent will be passed by, if a judgment in obser-
vance of such right would substitute a worse for a better custodian.”) (quoting
Richards v. Collins, 17 A. 831, 832 (N.J. 1889)).
150. Id.  Of course, not all courts were willing to subordinate the strict legal rights of
parents to the rights of children. See, e.g., In re Salter, 76 P. 51 (Cal. 1904) (hold-
ing that, under the state statutory scheme, a court has no discretion to appoint
the grandmother as the child’s if the father is not incompetent, notwithstanding
the trial court’s finding that the child’s health and general welfare would be bet-
ter served by placement with grandmother).  On the emergence of a robust legal
defense of parental rights, see, infra section II.D.
151. Herman v. State, 8 Ind. 545 (Ind. 1855).
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other.”152  Here, the court asserted, the principle was misapplied be-
cause “this prohibitory law forbids the owner to use his own in any
manner. . . .  It is based on the principle that a man shall not use at all
for enjoyment what his neighbor may abuse.”153  This doctrine would,
“if enforced by law in general practice, annihilate society, make
eunuchs of all men, or drive them into the cells of the monks, and
bring the human race to an end.”154  The court was not prepared to
have a hand in such dire consequences.
Rejecting what it perceived as a paternalistic attempt to protect
individuals from their own inclinations, the court relied on John
Milton’s famous endorsement of intellectual freedom.  Citing Milton’s
Areopagitica, a tract opposing pre-publication licensing, the court ad-
vanced a moral world order based on mankind’s free agency:
Such, however, is not the principle upon which the Almighty governs the
world.  He made man a free agent, and to give him opportunity to exercise his
will, to be virtuous or vicious as he should choose, he placed evil as well as
good before him, he put the apple into the garden of Eden, and left upon man
the responsibility of his choice, made it a moral question, and left it so.  He
enacted as to that, a moral, not a physical prohibition.  He could have easily
enacted a physical prohibitory law by declaring the fatal apple a nuisance and
removing it.  He did not.  His purpose was otherwise, and he has since de-
clared that the tares and wheat shall grow together to the end of the world.
Man cannot, by prohibitory law, be robbed of his free agency.155
For the Herman court, Milton’s God was an ideal parent, at least with
regard to the moral education of his children, for God would not rob
his children of the responsibility that attends moral choice.  He would
not keep them, to quote Milton, under “a perpetual childhood of pre-
scription.”156  The duty to educate means that the parent must help
the child to enter the empire of reason.  The child must be prepared for
a world where he will be obliged to make moral choices, to be virtuous
or vicious as he should choose—for a world, that is, without the parent
as his trustee.
The idea that the parent is only entrusted with the custody and
care of his child until the child reaches the age of intellectual and
152. Id. at 563.  On the common-law principle sic utere tuo ut alienum laedas as the
foundation of the state’s police power, see generally WILLIAM J. NOVAK, THE PEO-
PLE’S WELFARE: LAW AND REGULATION IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA (1996).
153. Herman, 8 Ind. at 563.
154. Id.
155. Id. (citing 1 JOHN MILTON, Areopagitica, in THE PROSE WORKS OF JOHN MILTON
166 (Philadelphia, John W. Moore, Rufus Wilmot Griswold ed., 1847) (1644).
156. MILTON, supra note 29.  On Milton in colonial America and the early republic, see
GEORGE F. SENSABAUGH, MILTON IN EARLY AMERICA (1964); Roland Mushat Frye,
The Dissidence of Dissent and the Origins of Religious Freedom in America: John
Milton and the Puritans, in 133 PROCEEDINGS OF THE AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL
SOCIETY 475, 485 (1989) (“In Milton’s clear vision, the processes of thought and
discovery are far too subtle and even fragile to be controlled by any authority,
however well meaning.”).
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moral discretion translated easily to colonial shores.  The revolution
against king and mother country was understood by both sides as a
conflict between parent and child.157  While Tory writers criticized the
wayward colonists for their filial ingratitude,158 the rebellious chil-
dren framed the war as one against the empire of the father, citing the
duty of the parent to assure the child’s enfranchisement.159  The polit-
ical argument against the authoritarian monarch went hand in hand
with a new conception of the parent’s domestic authority.  James
Henretta has observed how “[f]athers had begun to consider their role
not as that of patriarchs . . . , but rather as that of benefactors respon-
sible for the future well-being and prosperity of their offspring.”160
The new order of the ages brought with it “a new and different type of
family life, one characterized by solicitude and sentimentality toward
children and by more intimate, personal and equal relationships.”161
The new republic needed a new republican family, and the inculcation
of private virtue was a matter of public concern.162  In the new and
different type of colonial family, the child’s moral development was
the parent’s foremost responsibility.163
No figure was more responsible for this new interest in family edu-
cation than John Locke.164  In a thoughtful study of colonial anti-pa-
triarchalism, Jay Fliegelman describes how Locke’s “educational
theory redefined the nature of parental authority in very much the
way that the Revolution of 1688, which replaced an absolute monarch
with a constitutional one, redefined the rights and duties of the
crown.”165  For Locke, the controlling principle of family education,
like social arrangements more generally, is that of self-governance—
the child learning to guide himself by reason’s light and the parent
learning to trust the self-governing capacity of the child.  The differ-
157. See generally, JAY FLIEGELMAN, PRODIGALS AND PILGRIMS: THE AMERICAN REVOLU-
TION AGAINST PATRIARCHAL AUTHORITY, 1750–1800 (1982).
158. Id. at 96–97.
159. See id. at 97–105.
160. JAMES HENRETTA, THE EVOLUTION OF AMERICAN SOCIETY, 1700–1815, at 30
(1973).
161. Id.; see also GORDON S. WOOD, THE RADICALISM OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION
145–68 (1992) (noting the development of enlightened standards of paternalism
and the evolution of familial relations during this period).
162. On the emergence of the “republican” or “democratic” family, see GROSSBERG,
supra note 119, at 3–30; MASON, supra note 50, at 51–83; STEVEN MINTZ & SUSAN
KELLOGG, DOMESTIC REVOLUTIONS: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF AMERICAN FAMILY LIFE
43–65 (1988); and see also FLIEGELMAN, supra note 157, at 9–12 (noting the devel-
opment of a “different type of family life” during the late eighteenth century).
163. On “enlightened paternalism,” see WOOD, supra note 161, at 145–68.
164. On the influence of Locke on educational theory and practice, see HOLLY BREWER,
BY BIRTH OR CONSENT: CHILDREN, LAW, AND THE ANGLO-AMERICAN REVOLUTION IN
AUTHORITY 87–128 (2005); FLIEGELMAN, supra note 157, at 12–16; WOOD, supra
note 161, at 149–51.
165. FLIEGELMAN, supra note 157, at 13.
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ence between a child and an adult “lies not in the having or not having
Appetites, but in the Power to govern, and deny our selves in
them.”166  Children must grow “to the Use of Reason.”167  By gradu-
ally weaning the child from the “strict hand” of authority,168 the par-
ent fosters the child’s free and rational self-mastery, not slavish
obedience to the imperious temper of the parent.169  True obedience
must mean more than mere servility.
Like Milton before him,170 Locke would not praise a fugitive and
cloistered virtue, unexercised and unbreathed.171  More than knowing
how to read and write, education was a matter of moral exercise.  In a
world of temptation, a fallen world where good and evil grow up to-
gether—where “the tares and wheat shall grow together to the end of
the world”—only the educated mind is free to make the right moral
choices.172  According to Fliegelman, Locke’s me´lange of educational
theory and moral injunction would raise questions of freedom and au-
thority that were both personal and political.173  Fliegelman reads
popular eighteenth-century educational guidebooks as making the
point that parents “thwart the development of their children’s reason
by insisting that they accept without examination or inquiry all doc-
trines taught them.”174  In so doing, they “put their children’s salva-
tion in jeopardy; for saving faith is, by definition, that faith one freely
166. LOCKE, supra note 59, at 105 (“The having Desires accommodated to the Appre-
hensions and Relish of those several Ages is not the Fault; but the not having
them subject to the Rules and Restraints of Reason: The Difference lies not in
having or not having Appetites, but in the Power to govern, and deny our selves
[sic] in them.  He that is not used to submit his Will to the Reason of others, when
he is young, will scarce hearken to submit to his own Reason when he is of an Age
to make use of it. And what kind of a Man such an one is like to prove, is easie
[sic] to foresee.”).
167. Id. at 110.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 113 (noting that “slavish Discipline makes a slavish Temper”).
170. MILTON, supra note 29, at 287 (“He that can apprehend and consider vice with all
her baits and seeming pleasures, and yet abstain, and yet distinguish, and yet
prefer that which is truly better, he is the true warfaring Christian.  I cannot
praise a fugitive and cloistered virtue, unexercis’d and unbreath’d, that never
sallies out and sees her adversary, but slinks out of the race, where that im-
mortall [sic] garland is to be run for, not without dust and heat.”).
171. See LOCKE, supra note 59, at 111 (“He that has not a Mastery over his Inclina-
tions, he that knows not how to resist the importunity of present Pleasure or Pain,
for the sake of what Reason tells him is fit to be done, wants the true Principle of
Virtue and Industry, and is in danger never to be good for anything.”).
172. Herman v. State, 8 Ind. 545, 563 (Ind. 1855).
173. FLIEGELMAN, supra note 157, at 14 (“The great challenge of eighteenth-century
politics, familial and national, was to make authority and liberty compatible, to
find a surer ground for obligation and obedience than ‘the fear of the rod.’”).
174. Id. at 19; cf. WOOD, supra note 157, at 148 (“From every corner of the cultivated
world, [parents] were besieged with advice on what it meant to be a parent.  No
theme was more central to the popular writing of the eighteenth century.  Nearly
every work of the age . . . dwelt on issues of familial responsibility and warned
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and rationally chooses to embrace.”175  The upshot of this Protestant
stress on rational freedom was a pedagogical scheme that “concern[ed]
itself less with content, doctrinal or otherwise, than with perfecting
the mind’s ability to evaluate and judge.  The ideal teacher trains his
charges in the free use of their judgment that they might not only
become independent of his authority, but of the authority of all
others.”176
The parental duty to educate was enjoined by public regulation.
Beginning in 1647, Massachusetts enforced by fine a “compulsory sys-
tem upon parents and masters to teach their children and servants to
read, and to give them some knowledge of the Scriptures, and of the
capital laws, and to bring them up in some lawful employment.”177
Other states adopted similar compulsory education statutes.178  These
measures reached beyond the traditional target audiences of colonial
welfare.  In his eighteenth-century treatise on family law, Tapping
Reeve pointed out that the duty to educate “is not enforced by the law
of England, any farther than that overseers of the poor have, by stat-
ute, a power to bind out the children of paupers to masters, where
they may receive a proper education.”179  The colonies also had their
poor laws, under which the children of pauper parents were separated
from their parents and bound out as apprentices.  These statutes
targeted the children of “undeserving” parents, as would the child res-
cue schemes of the nineteenth century.180  In part, compulsory educa-
tion laws served a similar purpose, enforcing a parental duty that, as
James Kent pointed out, would provide children with a means of eco-
nomic self-sufficiency:
Without some preparation made in youth for the sequel of life, children of all
conditions would probably become idle and vicious when they grow up, either
from the want of good instruction and habits, and the means of subsistence, or
from want of rational and useful occupation.  A parent who sends his son into
the world uneducated, and without skill in any art or science, does a great
injury to mankind, as well as to his own family, for he defrauds the commu-
nity of a useful citizen, and bequeaths to it a nuisance.181
against the evils of parental tyranny and the harsh and arbitrary modes of child-
rearing of an older, more savage age.”).
175. FLIEGELMAN, supra note 157, at 19.
176. Id. at 20.
177. KENT, supra note 89, at 196 n.(g).
178. See id. at 196–202.
179. TAPPING REEVE, THE LAW OF BARON AND FEMME 287 (New Haven, Oliver Steele
1816).
180. For a discussion of the “child saving” movement of the nineteenth century, see,
for example, Woodhouse, supra note 12, at 1052–54.
181. KENT, supra note 89, at 195.
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Where parents could not—or would not—adequately educate their
children, the state was free to employ the same coercive mechanism
that separated parent from child under the poor laws.182
Compulsory education laws also suggest the moral focus of early
child welfare efforts.  The duty of the parent to educate was not just a
matter of the poor child’s economic self-sufficiency (and the economic
welfare of the community); it was a matter of every child’s rational
self-sufficiency (and the political welfare of the community).183  Such
laws had always expressed a Protestant concern with the individual’s
direct knowledge of the Bible.184  For Reeve, the point of education
was not to keep down relief costs, but to create children who “may be
able, for themselves, to search scriptures of truth.”185  The child needs
an education to both join the community as a contributing member
and if he is ever to move beyond the empire of the father.  Thus, (then,
as now) state control of education could seem to undermine parental
authority in a way that other welfare measures did not.186  For if the
point of the child’s education is to question authority—that is, to sub-
stitute a self-mastery for parental control187—then, from the parent’s
point of view, the child’s growing intellectual and moral autonomy
may be far more alarming than any political infringement of parental
182. See REEVE, supra note 179, at 287 (“[I]f the parents will not teach their children
in such manner, the selectmen of the town are enjoined to take their children
from their parents, and bind them out to proper masters; where they will be edu-
cated to some useful employment, and will be taught to read and write, and the
rules of arithmetic, so far as is necessary to transact ordinary business.”).
183. Cf. S.M. Heslet, Compulsory Education, 14 ILLINOIS TEACHER 86, 87 (1868) (“The
man that will not feed and clothe his children is compelled to surrender them,
that they may be fed and clothed at public expense. . . .  Should not he, then, who
starves the minds of his children be compelled to send them where mental food is
furnished free of charge.”).
184. See KENT, supra note 89, at 196 n.(g).  The Massachusetts School Act of 1647,
popularly known as the Old Deluder Satan Act, equated educational neglect with
a satanic project “to keep men from a knowledge of the Scriptures.” See Eric R.
Eberling, Massachusetts Education Laws of 1642, 1647, and 1648, in HISTORICAL
DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN EDUCATION 225, 225–26 (Richard J. Altenbaugh ed.,
1999).
185. REEVE, supra note 179, at 286.
186. The Connecticut compulsory education law, Reeve noted, “has, by some, been
branded as tyrannical, and as an infringement of parental rights.” Id. at 287.
187. See FLIEGELMAN, supra note 157, at 14 (“The ultimate point of the education and
childrearing was not to secure a child’s obedience, but to prepare a child for his
eventual emergence into the world—in effect, to prepare him for the death of his
parents.  Thus, according to Locke, it is essential that parental instruction en-
courage the development of a child’s reason, or ‘internal governor’; for it will be
reason along with a carefully ingrained set of habits, that ultimately will replace
the external parent as that ‘power of restraint which permits an individual to
deny himself his own Desires and cross his inclinations,’ to restrain his own pas-
sions and act according to his own best interest.”) (quoting JOHN LOCKE, Some
Thoughts Concerning Education, in THE EDUCATIONAL WRITINGS OF JOHN LOCKE
114, 139 (James Axtell ed., 1968) (1693)).
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rights.  Once children begin to think for themselves, they may find
truths that to their parents are surprising and unsupportable.
New republican ideas about the family would lead to increased
state regulation of parent–child relations.  The traditional presump-
tion that custody should be allocated to the father was less and less
acceptable against the background of “the republican vision of the
family as a collection of individuals.”188  Michael Grossberg has
pointed to the 1809 case of Prather v. Prather as an early instance of
how post-Revolutionary courts “undermined the primacy of paternal
custody rights.”189  Complaining of ill usage, Jeanette Prather sued
her husband William for a separate maintenance and custody of their
infant daughter.190  The court candidly admitted that it was “it [was]
treading new and dangerous grounds,”191 but it nonetheless ordered
that custody of the child be surrendered to the mother.192  Under the
doctrine of parens patriae, nineteenth-century courts would gradually
assume “sovereign custodial power over children,”193 eroding the law’s
biases in favor of patriarchal authority.194  Grossberg describes how,
as the “father’s custody power evolved from a property right to a trust
tied to his responsibilities as a guardian,”195 a new republican custody
law emerged, “first in scattered decisions early in the nineteenth cen-
tury and then in an increasingly intricate and expansive body of rules
188. GROSSBERG, supra note 119, at 234.  On the development of a child-centered cus-
tody law in nineteenth-century America, see id. at 289–307; Mason, supra note
150, at 51–83; Zainaldin, supra note 140, at 1052–68.
189. GROSSBERG, supra note 119, at 238.
190. Prather v. Prather, 4 S.C. Eq. (4 Des. Eq.) 33, 33–34 (1809).
191. Id. at 44.
192. Id.
193. GROSSBERG, supra note 119, at 236.
194. For a discussion of how republican anti-patriarchalism shaped nineteenth-cen-
tury custody law, undermining the legal presumption in favor of the father over
the mother, see id. at 238–53.  Grossberg also describes the steady erosion of the
legal presumption in favor of biological over surrogate parents. See id. at 254–80.
Nineteenth-century courts anticipated the concept of psychological parenthood,
advanced most famously in JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL., BEYOND THE BEST INTER-
ESTS OF THE CHILD (1973). See, e.g., Chapsky v. Wood, 26 Kan. 650, 657 (Kan.
1881) (“The affection which a mother may have and does have, springing from the
fact that a child is her offspring, is an affection which perhaps no other one can
really possess; but so far as it is possible, springing from years of patient care of a
little, helpless babe, from association, and as an outgrowth from those little cares
and motherly attentions bestowed upon it, an affection for the child is seen in [the
foster mother] that can be found nowhere else.  And it is apparent, that so far as a
mother’s love can be equaled, its foster-mother has that love, and will continue to
have it.”); Hoxsie v. Potter, 16 R.I. 374 (R.I. 1888) (employing “established ties”
doctrine to deny remarried mother’s petition to take child from paternal uncle);
HOCHHEIMER, supra note 1, at 16–17 (citing cases decided on “established ties”
principle).
195. GROSSBERG, supra note 119, at 236.
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as the [century] came to an end.”196  A growing concern with child
nurture would bias courts in favor of maternal custody rights.197  This
concern did not just dictate a devaluation of the father’s claims.  The
law “reduced the rights of parenthood generally” as courts increas-
ingly made the final determination of child placement a matter of judi-
cial discretion.198
To those who built a nation on the liberal legacy of Milton and
Locke, the stress of accommodating multiple truths was a cost of true
freedom.  Thomas Jefferson thought that governmental efforts to co-
erce moral agreement “tend only to beget habits of hypocrisy and
meanness.”199  Like Milton, Jefferson would leave the mind free to
choose, following the dictates of reason and conscience.  According to
Jefferson, the coercive unification of opinion is “a departure from the
plan of the Holy author of our religion, who being Lord both of body
and mind yet chose not to propagate it by coercions on either.”200  Sim-
ilarly, the Virginia Statute for Religious Freedom embodies confidence
that “[t]ruth will prevail if left to herself,”201 the same faith in free
argument and debate that would later lead to constitutional guaran-
tees of freedom of conscience.  While Jefferson was fearful that suc-
ceeding generations might not follow the path of moral freedom and
responsibility, he and his contemporaries believed that the only sav-
ing faith is the one that is freely chosen.202
C. The State as Common Guardian
The nineteenth century witnessed the birth of new laws “that
placed far less value on familial autonomy, authorized much greater
196. Id. at 237.
197. See GROSSBERG, supra note 119, at 238–53.  Grossberg writes that “[b]y the 1820s
traditional paternal custody rights had declined so precipitously that some judges
began to seek a means by which fathers could be given presumptive but not abso-
lute rights.” Id. at 239.
198. Id. at 248.
199. JEFFERSON, supra note 27, at xvii.
200. Id.
201. Id. at xviii (“[T]ruth is great, and will prevail if left to herself, that she is the
proper and sufficient antagonist to error, and has nothing to fear from the con-
flict, unless by human interposition disarmed of her natural weapons free argu-
ment and debate, errors ceasing to be dangerous when it is permitted freely to
contradict them . . . .”).
202. See id. (“And though we well know that this assembly elected by the people for
the ordinary purposes of legislation only, have no power to restrain the acts of
succeeding assemblies, constituted with powers equal to our own, and that there-
fore to declare this act irrevocable would be of no effect in law; yet we are free to
declare, and do declare, that the rights hereby asserted, are of the natural rights
of mankind, and that if any act shall be hereafter passed to repeal the present or
to narrow its operation, such act will be an infringement of natural right.”); cf. W.
Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 641 (1943) (“Compulsory unifica-
tion of opinion achieves only the unanimity of the graveyard.”).
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intervention into parental relations, and enthusiastically contem-
plated the reshaping of family life.”203  For Jill Elaine Hasday, these
measures were at sharp variance with common law principles.204
“The principles that the new bodies of law applied to family relations
were diametrically opposed to those that governed the common
law.”205  Legislatures and courts created what Hasday refers to as a
bifurcated law of parent–child relations: a deferential legal regime
consistent with common law principles for “successful” families and a
regime that operated outside the confines of family law altogether by
subjecting “failed” families to aggressive state action.206  However, in-
terference in “failed” families was precisely the point of the common
law.  State laws that restricted parental custody were entirely consis-
tent with the principle that parental authority derived from the fulfill-
ment of parental duty.207
On this principle, the courts repeatedly held that parental control
of the child is subject to ordinary state regulation.  In 1816, in United
States v. Bainbridge,208 the federal circuit court rejected—as “not a
little extraordinary”—the argument that Congress could not enlist mi-
nors to serve in the military without the consent of their parents.209
Writing for the Court, Justice Story agreed that at common law the
father is entitled to the custody of his children during their infancy,
but this right “is not unlimited; for whenever it is abused by improper
conduct on the part of the parent, courts of law will restrain him in its
exercise, and even take the custody permanently from him.”210  The




207. On the evolution of the parens patriae doctrine in the nineteenth century, see
generally Douglas R. Rendleman, Parens Patriae: From Chancery to Juvenile
Court, 23 S.C. L. REV. 205 (1971).
208. United States v. Bainbridge, 24 F. Cas. 946, 950 (C.C.D. Mass. 1816) (No.
14,497).
209. Compare this with Justice Story’s opinion in United States v. Green, 26 F. Cas.
30, 31–32 (C.C.R.I. 1824) (No. 15,256) (“As to the question of the right of the
father to have the custody of his infant child, in a general sense it is true.  But
this is not on account of any absolute right of the father, but for the benefit of the
infant, the law presuming it to be for his interest to be under the nurture and
care of his natural protector, both for maintenance and education.  When, there-
fore, the court is asked to lend its aid to put the infant into the custody of the
father, and to withdraw him from other persons, it will look into all the circum-
stances, and ascertain whether it will be for the real, permanent interests of the
infant; and if the infant be of sufficient discretion, it will also consult its personal
wishes.  It will free it from all undue restraint, and endeavour, as far as possible,
to administer a conscientious, parental duty with reference to its welfare.  It is an
entire mistake to suppose the court is at all events bound to deliver over the
infant to his father, or that the latter has an absolute vested right in the
custody.”).
210. Bainbridge, 24 F. Cas. at 949.
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power of the courts in this regard rested on the fact that “the right of
parents, in relation to the custody and services of their children . . .
are rights depending upon the mere municipal rules of the state, and
may be enlarged, restrained, and limited as the wisdom or policy of
the times may dictate, unless the legislative power be controlled by
some constitutional prohibition.”211  Justice Story was unperturbed at
the prospect of infringing upon parental rights: “And if this exercise
[of a valid congressional power] should sometimes trench upon sup-
posed private rights, or private convenience, it is to be enumerated
among the sacrifices, which the very order of society exacts from its
members in furtherance of the public welfare.”212
That parental rights could be abridged by “ordinary legislation”
was also assumed by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court when it de-
cided the 1839 case of Ex parte Crouse.213  This was a habeas case, in
which the father of Mary Ann Crouse sought her release from the
state’s House of Refuge (a juvenile reformatory), where she had been
committed upon her mother’s petition.214  The court declared that
“[t]he right of parental control is a natural, but not an unalienable
one.  It is not excepted [by the state constitution] out of the subjects of
ordinary legislation; and it consequently remains subject to the ordi-
nary legislative power.”215  More specifically, according to the court,
the business of educating children properly belongs to the state as
part of its parens patriae power.  The right of parents to educate their
children is at most provisional, held at the sufferance of the state;
when circumstances dictate, the parent can be superseded by the state
as the “common guardian of the community”:
The object of [the House of Refuge] is reformation, by training its inmates to
industry; by imbuing their minds with principles of morality and religion; by
furnishing them with means to earn a living; and, above all, by separating
them from the corrupting influence of improper associates.  To this end, may
not the natural parents, when unequal to the task of education, or unworthy
of it, be superseded by the parens patriæ, or common guardian of the commu-
nity?  It is to be remembered that the public has a paramount interest in the
virtue and knowledge of its members, and that, of strict right, the business of
education belongs to it.216
211. Id.; see also id. at 950 (“Can there be a doubt, that the state legislature can, by a
new statute, declare a minor to be of full age, and capable of acting for himself at
fourteen, instead of twenty-one years of age?  Can it not emancipate the child
altogether from the control of its parents?”).
212. Id. at 950.
213. Ex Parte Crouse, 4 Whart. 9, 11 (Pa. 1839).
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id.; cf. Etna, 8 F. Cas. 803, 804 (D. Me. 1838) (No. 4,562) (“[T]his paternal power
is not of the nature of a sovereign and independent power.  It is subject to the
restraints and regulation of law.  Upon the principles of the law of nature, as well
as of the municipal law of this country, it is inseparably connected with the pa-
rental obligations, and arises out of them.  It is not a power granted to the parent
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Underlying the idea of parental custody as a trust is what New
York’s highest court called “the great principle” that the custody of
children “must always be regulated by judicial discretion, exercised in
reference to their best interests.”217  In Mercein v. People ex rel. Barry,
the court came to the “undoubting conclusion, that the right of the
father to the custody of his child is not absolute.”218  The welfare of
the child is properly “a portion of the sovereign power,”219 and because
the sovereign lacks “the requisite knowledge necessary to a judicious
discharge of the duties of guardianship and education of children,
such portion of the sovereign power as relates to the discharge of these
duties, is transferred to the parents.”220  However, “[t]here is no pa-
for his benefit, but allowed to him for the benefit of the child . . . .”); State v.
Clottu, 33 Ind. 409, 411–12 (Ind. 1870) (“Except in countries which lie in barba-
rism, the authority of the parent over the child is nowhere left absolutely without
municipal definition and regulation. . . .  The right of the parent to ruin his child
either morally or physically has no existence in nature.  The subject has always
been regarded as within the purview of legislative authority.  How far this inter-
ference should extend is a question, not of constitutional power for the courts, but
of expediency and propriety, which it is the sole province of the legislature to
determine.  The judiciary has no authority to interfere with this exercise of legis-
lative judgment; and to do so would be to invade the province which by the consti-
tution is assigned exclusively to the law making power.”); Bennet v. Bennet, 13
N.J. Eq. 114, 118 (N.J. Ch. 1860) (“The argument [that state statute transferring
custody of young children from father to mother is unconstitutional] proceeds on
the assumption that the parent has the same right of property in the child that
he has in his horse, or that the master has in his slave, and that the transfer of
the custody of the child from the father to the mother, is an invasion of the fa-
ther’s right of property.  The father has no such right.  He has no property,
whatever, in his children.  The law imposes upon him, for the good of society and
for the welfare of the child, certain specified duties.  By the laws of nature and of
society, he owes the child protection, maintenance, and education.  In return for
the discharge of those duties, and to aid in their performance, the law confers on
the father a qualified right to the services of the child.  But . . . the domestic
relations and the relative rights of parent and child are all under the control and
regulation of municipal laws.”).
217. Mercein v. People ex rel. Barry, 25 Wend. 64, 101 (N.Y. 1840), rev’d 3 Hill 399
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1842).
218. Id. at 105.
219. See id. at 103 (“It seems then, that by the law of nature, the father has no para-
mount inalienable right to the custody of his child.  And the civil or municipal law
in setting bounds to his parental authority, and in entirely or partially depriving
him of it in cases where the interests and welfare of his child require it, does not
come in conflict with or subvert any of the principles of the natural law.  The
moment a child is born, it owes allegiance to the government of the country of its
birth, and is entitled to the protection of that government.  And such government
is obligated by its duty of protection, to consult the welfare, comfort and interests
of such child in regulating its custody during the period of its minority.”).
220. Id. (“By the law of nature, the father has no paramount right to the custody of his
child. . . .  On the establishment of civil societies, the power of the chief of a family
as sovereign, passes to the chief or government of the nation.  And the chief or
magistrate of the nation not possessing the requisite knowledge necessary to a
judicious discharge of the duties of guardianship and education of children, such
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rental authority independent of the supreme power of the state,”221
and the delegation of state duties is “subject to such restrictions and
limitations as the sovereign power of the nation think proper to pre-
scribe.”222  In all cases, “[t]he rights of the parents must . . . yield to
the interests and welfare of the infant.”223
The trust model of parent–child relations was enthusiastically em-
braced by the child advocates of the nineteenth century,224 but it was
not the intellectual property of welfare reformers alone.  In his trea-
tise on the constitutional limits of the state’s police power, Christo-
pher Tiedeman argued that “[t]he authority to control the child is not
the natural right of the parents; it emanates from the State, and is an
exercise of police power.”225  Tiedeman was anything but partial to the
assertion of state authority.  For him, popular government was a repu-
diation of absolutism “in its most repulsive form”—the divine right of
kings.226  Because the king obtained his authority “from above,” there
were no definite limitations on royal power:
The king ruled by divine right, and obtaining his authority from above he ac-
knowledged no natural rights in the individual.  If it was his pleasure to give
to his people a wide room for individual activity, the subject had no occasion
for complaint.  But [the subject] could not raise any effective opposition to the
pleasure of the ruler, if he should see fit to impose numerous restrictions, all
tending to oppress the weaker for the benefit of the stronger.227
When divine right was replaced by a theory of popular government,
Tiedeman continued, “the opposite principle [was] substituted: that all
portion of the sovereign power as relates to the discharge of these duties, is trans-
ferred to the parents, subject to such restrictions and limitations as the sovereign
power of the nation think proper to prescribe.”).
221. Id.
222. Id.; see also id. at 101 (“The father’s right to his child is not absolute and inaliena-
ble.  In those American cases which uphold to the greatest extent the right of the
father, it is conceded that it may be lost by his ill usage, immoral principles or
habits, or by his inability to provide for his children.”).
223. Id. at 102; see also Lippincott v. Lippincott, 128 A. 254, 255 (N.J. 1925) (“Mani-
festly, the touchstone of our jurisprudence in matters dealing with the custody
and control of infants is the welfare and happiness of the infant, and not the final
affections naturally arising from parental or family relationship.  Thus, it has
been quite generally held that even the natural right of the father to the custody
of his child cannot be treated as an absolute property right, but rather as a trust
reposed in the father by the state, as parens patriae for the welfare of the infant.”)
(citations omitted).  Of course, not all nineteenth century courts were ready to
disregard patriarchal notions of parental custody rights. See Zainaldin, supra
note 140, at 1059–68 (describing “traditionalist interlude” of the 1830s); Rendle-
man, supra note 207, at 233 (noting that the development of governmental au-
thority to control family affairs was not without “some setbacks”).
224. See, e.g., Woodhouse, supra note 12, at 1050–68.
225. TIEDEMAN, supra note 52, at 554.
226. Id. at v.
227. Id.
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government power is derived from the people.”228  But this principle,
too, was subject to abuse.  For many years after popular government
was established, “there was no marked disposition manifested by the
majority to interfere with the like liberties of the minority.”229
On the contrary the sphere of governmental activity was confined within the
smallest limits by the popularization of the so-called laissez-faire doctrine,
which denies to government the power to do more than to provide for the pub-
lic order and personal security by the prevention and punishment of crimes
and trespasses.  Under the influence of this doctrine, the encroachments of
government upon the rights and liberties of the individual have been compar-
atively few.230
However, the economic pressures of the nineteenth century eroded
doctrines of governmental inactivity and subjugated the rights of the
minority (presumably, what Tiedeman refers to as the conservative
classes) to a constitutionally impermissible “assumption by govern-
ment of the paternal character altogether.”231  For Tiedeman, it was
as though the state, acting as parens patriae, was too generous a fa-
ther and too solicitous of its many weak children.
Governmental interference is proclaimed and demanded everywhere as a suf-
ficient panacea for every social evil which threaten the prosperity of society.
Socialism, Communism, and Anarchism are rampant throughout the civilized
world.  The state is called on to protect the weak against the shrewdness of
the stronger, to determine what wages a workman shall receive for his labor,
and how many hours daily he shall labor.  Many trades and occupations are
being prohibited because some are damaged incidentally by their prosecution,
and many ordinary pursuits are made government monopolies.  The demands
of the Socialists and Communists vary in degree and in detail, and the most
extreme of them insist upon the assumption by government of the paternal
character altogether, abolishing all private property in land, and making the
State the sole possessor of the working capital of the nation.
Contemplating these extraordinary demands of the great army of discon-
tents, and their apparent power, with the growth and development of univer-
sal suffrage, to enforce their views of civil polity upon the civilized world, the
conservative classes stand in constant fear of the advent of an absolutism
more tyrannical and more unreasoning than any before experienced by man,
the absolutism of a democratic majority.232
Tiedeman’s goal was to demonstrate that this new form of the pa-
triarchal principle—democratic absolutism—is “impossible in this
country, as long as the popular reverence for the constitutions, in their
restrictions upon governmental activity, is nourished and sustained
by a prompt avoidance by the courts of any violations of their provi-
228. Id. (“[I]nstead of the king being the vicegerent of God, and the people subjects of
the king, the king and other officers of the government were servants of the peo-
ple, the people became the real sovereign through the officials.”).
229. Id. at vi.
230. Id.
231. Id. at vii.
232. Id. at vi–vii.
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sions, in word or in spirit.”233  The proper object of government is to
protect private rights.234  These rights “do not rest upon the mandate
of the municipal law as a source.  They belong to man in a state of
nature.”235  The object of government, through its police power, is “to
impose that degree of restraint upon human actions which is neces-
sary to the uniform and reasonable conservation and enjoyment of pri-
vate rights.”236  Any further use of the police power is “a govern-
mental usurpation.”237
Any law which goes beyond that principle, which undertakes to abolish rights,
the exercise of which does not involve an infringement of the rights of others,
or to limit the exercise of rights beyond what is necessary to provide for the
public welfare and the general security, cannot be included in the police power
of the government.238
What, then, about laws restricting parental authority?  Tiedeman
distinguishes the family as a political institution (a subdivision of the
body politic) from the family as a “domestic relation.”  In “early his-
tory,” the family was an independent political entity, with the father
as autocrat.239  During this “patriarchal age,” the father ruled “with-
out constraint, could command the service of the child, make a valid
sale of the adult children as well as the minor, and punish them for
offenses, inflicting any penalty which his wisdom or caprice may sug-
gest, even to the taking of life.”240  The father was the king of the fam-
ily, ruling with the same absolutism as the monarch whose authority
came from above.  This absolute control, according to Tiedeman, de-
rived from the political character of the family as an institution of gov-
ernment.  Absolute paternal authority was part of a larger political
arrangement—and that authority dissolved as part of new political ar-
rangements.  When the family “ceases to be a subdivision of the body
politic, and becomes a domestic relation instead of a political institu-
tion, . . . this absolute control of the children is taken away.”241  The
children become autonomous members of the body politic and “acquire
political and civil rights, independently of the father.”242
By the abolition of the family relation as a political institution, the child,
whatever may be his age, acquires the same claim to liberty of action as the
adult, viz.: the right to the largest liberty that is consistent with the enjoy-
ment of a like liberty on the part of others; and he is only subject to restraint,
233. Id. at vii.
234. Id. at 1.
235. Id.
236. Id. at 1.
237. Id. at 4.
238. Id.
239. Id. at 551.
240. Id. at 551–52.
241. Id. at 552.
242. Id.; cf. Mercein v. People ex rel.  Barry, 25 Wend. 64, 103 (N.Y. 1840) (“On the
establishment of civil societies, the power of the chief of a family as sovereign,
passes to the chief or government of the nation.”).
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so far as such restraint is necessary for the promotion of the general welfare
or beneficial as a means of protection to himself.  The parent has no natural
vested right to the control of the child.243
Thus, the father’s “supreme control” is “transferred to the State, the
father retaining only such power of control over his children during
minority, as the promptings of nature and a due consideration of the
welfare of the child would suggest.”244  As a result, the parent’s power
over the child “is in the nature of a trust, reposed in him by the State
. . . , which may be extended or contracted as the public welfare may
require.”245  What the state gives, it can take away.  Parental control
of the child can be extended or contracted because it is only “as a po-
lice regulation,” not as a right, “that the subjection of minor children
to the control of parents may be justified under constitutional limita-
tions.246 The authority to control the child is not the natural right of
the parents; it emanates from the State, and is an exercise of police
power.”247
For Tiedeman, there is no right of parents to direct the upbringing
of their children.  Because the control of children is an exercise of po-
lice power, parental control is a privilege or a duty.248  Of course, not
every denial of parental authority would be “enforcible or benefi-
cial.”249  Tiedeman would trust that “[t]he natural affection of parents
for their offspring is ordinarily the strongest guarantee that the best
interests of the child as well as society will be subserved.”250  State
interference with the natural bond between parent and child should
be reserved for exceptional cases.251  Quoting Philemon Bliss’s 1886
treatise, Of Sovereignty, Tiedeman returns to his anti-communistic
theme, this time focusing on the abolition of private familial rights:
“Constitutions fail when they ignore our nature.  Plato’s republic,
abolishing the family, making infants but children of the State, exists
only in the imagination.”252  To ignore human nature is to invite popu-
lar discontent.253  It would be startling, Tiedeman writes, if the police
243. TIEDEMAN, supra note 52, at 552 (emphasis added).
244. Id.
245. Id. at 553.
246. Id. at 554.
247. Id. (emphasis added). But cf. People ex rel. O’Connell v. Turner, 55 Ill. 280 (Ill.
1870) (discussing parental authority as inherent and inalienable right).  On Tur-
ner, see Fox, supra note 102, at 1215–22; Rendleman, supra note 207, at 233–36;
David S. Tanenhaus, Between Dependency and Liberty: The Conundrum of Chil-
dren’s Rights in the Gilded Age, 23 LAW & HIST. REV. 351 (2005).
248. TIEDEMAN, supra note 52, at 554.
249. Id. at 561.
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. Id. (quoting PHILEMON BLISS, ON SOVEREIGNTY 17 (Boston, Little, Brown & Co.
1865)).
253. “[A] law, which interferes without a good cause with the parental authority, will
surely prove a dead letter.” Id.
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power were to be “carried to its extreme limit . . . that, . . . the State
may take away the parental control altogether, and assume the care
and education of the child, whenever in the judgment of the legisla-
ture such action may be necessary for the public good, or the welfare of
the child.”254  Yet, these are policy considerations,255 and such consid-
erations are not the concerns of the court.  “[T]hey cannot bring the
constitutionality of the law into question, enabling the courts to refuse
to carry the law into execution in any case that might arise under
it.”256
Teideman concludes his discussion of the parent–child relation
with a brief review of the compulsory school attendance question.257
By mid-century, child rescue schemes had broadened beyond the law
of apprenticeship and institutional commitment.258  In 1852, Massa-
chusetts became the first state to make school attendance compul-
sory.259  By 1900, more than thirty states had enacted compulsory
attendance statutes.260  The impact of this legislation was to make
state regulation of the parent–child relation a matter that affected all
parents.  Who properly had custody of the child—or, at least, who
properly controlled the child’s education—was no longer a matter of
concern primarily to marginal communities.  Tiedeman accepts that it
is within the police power of the state to establish free schools, but
considers it a serious question whether the state can require school
attendance against the wishes of the parents.261  The constitutionality
of compulsory attendance laws depends on whether the control of chil-
dren is a parental right or is held to be a privilege or duty.  Tiedeman
254. Id. at 554.
255. Id. at 561.
256. Id.  The determination that parental custody is a privilege, and not a right, im-
poses upon the courts a position of deference to legislative judgment. See id. at
560 (“If it is the parent’s natural right, then the State cannot arbitrarily take the
child away from the care of the parents; and any interference with the parental
control must be justified as a police regulation on the grounds that the assump-
tion of the control of the child by the State is necessary for the public good, be-
cause of the evil character of the parents; and like all other similar cases of
restraint upon natural right, the commitment of the child to the care of the State
authorities must rest upon a judicial degree, after a fair trial, in which the par-
ents have a right to appear and defend themselves against the charge of being
unfit to retain custody of the child.  Whereas, if the parental control be only a
privilege or duty, granted or imposed by the State, it rests with the discretion of
the legislature to determine under what circumstances, if at all, a parent may be
entrusted with the rearing of his child, and it is not a judicial question whether
the legislative judgment was well founded.”).
257. Id. at 561–63.
258. See id.
259. See MICHAEL S. KATZ, A HISTORY OF COMPULSORY EDUCATION LAWS 17 (1976).
260. Id. at 17–18.  In 1918, Mississippi became the last state to pass a compulsory
school attendance law.  The law was repealed in 1956. Id. at 18.  On the history
of the common-school system, see generally, for example, KAESTLE, supra note 39.
261. TIEDEMAN, supra note 52, at 562.
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predicted that “under the influence of social forces now at work” the
state’s authority to compel attendance at some school would prevail
“and compulsory education become very general.”262
Tiedeman was right, of course.  Compulsory education would be-
come very general—universal, in fact.  However, requiring school at-
tendance against the wishes of parents, and, more particularly,
mandating curricular requirements against the wishes of parents,
would create a parental rights backlash.263  For the last quarter of the
nineteenth century and the first quarter of the twentieth, education
would be at the forefront of a great cultural and constitutional debate
to determine the proper scope of state authority to regulate the family.
D. The Parental Rights Backlash
By 1918, all states had passed school attendance legislation, and
state enforcement mechanisms were increasingly efficient.264  The
success of compulsory attendance laws prompted the beginning of
rights-based constitutional challenges to state control of education.
For the most part, these challenges saw only modest success.  Direct
assaults on compulsory attendance laws were rejected by the courts on
the ground that “[t]he natural rights of a parent to the custody and
control of his infant child are subordinate to the power of the state,
and may be restricted and regulated by municipal laws.”265  The
262. Id. at 563.
263. On parental resistance to common schooling prior to 1860, see, for example,
KAESTLE, supra note 39, at 136–81, and RAVITCH, supra note 8, at 33–76.
264. On the history of compulsory attendance statutes, see generally MICHAEL S.
KATZ, supra note 259; LAWRENCE KOTIN & WILLIAM F. AIKMAN, LEGAL FOUNDA-
TIONS OF COMPULSORY SCHOOL ATTENDANCE (1980); Martin Jay Eisenberg, Com-
pulsory Attendance Legislation in America, 1870 to 1915 (1988) (unpublished
Ph.D. dissertation, University of Pennsylvania) (on file with author); Stephen J.
Provasnik, Compulsory Schooling, from Idea to Institution: A Case Study of the
Development of the Compulsory Attendance in Illinois, 1857–1907 (1999) (unpub-
lished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago) (on file with author).
265. See, e.g., State v. Bailey, 61 N.E. 730, 731–32 (Ind. 1901) (“The natural rights of a
parent to the custody and control of his infant child are subordinate to the power
of the state, and may be restricted and regulated by municipal laws.  One of the
most important natural duties of the parent is his obligation to educate his child,
and this duty he owes not to the child only, but to the commonwealth.  If he ne-
glects to perform it or willfully refuses to do so, he may be coerced by law to
execute such civil obligation.  The welfare of the child and the best interests of
society require that the state shall exert its sovereign authority to secure to the
child the opportunity to acquire an education.”); State v. Jackson, 71 N.H. 552
(N.H. 1902); Stephens v. Bongart, 189 A. 131, 132 (Essex County Ct., N.J. 1937)
(“This statute is a legitimate exercise of the police power of the state.  The object
of the legislation was to create an enlightened American citizenship in sympathy
with our principles and ideals, and to prevent children reared in America from
remaining ignorant and illiterate.  If it is within the police power of the state to
regulate wages, to legislate respecting housing conditions in crowded cities, to
prohibit dark rooms in tenement houses, to compel landlords to place windows in
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courts echoed the longstanding principle that parental power derives
from parental duty, a duty owed both to the child and the state.266
There is no parental right that would allow a parent to deprive his
child of a proper education.267
However, several courts upheld parental challenges to specific re-
quirements as part of the public school curriculum.268  Because spe-
cific curricular requirements so directly challenged the educational
prerogatives of public school parents, these cases provided a platform
from which some courts sought to create new limits on state regula-
tion of the family.  In doing so, they relied on a reading of the common
law that more or less rejected the contingent nature of parental power.
The parent was given a “paramount right” to choose what courses his
child would take from those prescribed by the state-mandated curricu-
lum.269  Though the presumption was that the parent would make “a
their tenements which will enable their tenants to enjoy the sunshine, it is within
the police power of the state to compel every resident of New Jersey so to educate
his children that the light of American ideals will permeate the life of our future
citizens.”); State v. Williams, 56 S.D. 370 (S.D. 1929).
266. See, e.g., Bailey, 61 N.E. at 732 (“One of the most important natural duties of the
parent is his obligation to educate his child, and this duty he owes not to the child
only, but to the commonwealth.  If he neglects to perform it or willfully refuses to
do so, he may be coerced by law to execute such civil obligation.  The welfare of
the child and the best interests of society require that the state shall exert its
sovereign authority to secure to the child the opportunity to acquire an
education.”).
267. Id. (“To carry out the enlightened and comprehensive system of education en-
joined by the constitution of this state, a vast fund, dedicated exclusively to this
purpose, has been set apart.  Revenues to the amount of more than $2,000,000
annually are distributed among the school corporations of the state.  No parent
can be said to have the right to deprive his child of the advantages so provided,
and to defeat the purposes of such munificent appropriations.”).
268. See Hardwick v. Bd. of Sch. Trs., 205 P. 49 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1921) (compelling
admission of students whose parents objected to dance classes); Trs. of Schs. v.
People ex rel. Van Allen, 87 Ill. 303 (Ill. 1877) (grammar); Rulison v. Post, 79 Ill.
567 (Ill. 1875) (bookkeeping); State ex rel. Kelley v. Ferguson, 95 Neb. 63, 71–73,
144 N.W. 1039, 1043 (Neb. 1914) (compelling admission of student whose father
objected to the study of domestic science); State ex rel. Sheibley v. Sch. Dist. No.
1, 31 Neb. 552, 48 N.W. 393 (Neb. 1891) (objection to the study of grammar);
Morrow w. Wood, 35 Wis. 59 (Wis. 1874) (geography).  Other courts deferred to
school authorities. See State ex rel. Andrews v. Webber, 8 N.E. 708 (Ind. 1886)
(music); Kidder v. Chellis, 59 N.H. 473 (1879) (public speaking); Sewell v. Bd. of
Educ., 29 Ohio St. 89 (1876) (rhetoric); Guernsey v. Pitkin, 32 Vt. 224 (Vt. 1859)
(composition).
269. Morrow, 35 Wis. at 66; see also id. at 64 (“We do not really understand that there
is any recognized principle of law, nor do we think there is any rule of morals or
social usage, which gives the teacher an absolute right to prescribe and dictate
what studies a child shall pursue, regardless of the wishes or views of the parent,
and, as incident to this, gives the right to enforce obedience even as against the
orders of the parent.  From what source does the teacher derive this authority?
From what maxim or rule of the law of the land?  Ordinarily, it will be conceded,
the law gives the parent the exclusive right to govern and control the conduct of
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wise and judicious selection,”270 the rights of the parent, not the best
interests of the child, were the focus of judicial attention.271
Typical of these curricular requirements cases is School Board Dis-
trict No. 18, Garvin County v. Thompson.272  In Thompson, school offi-
cials expelled several children who, “under the direction of their
parents,” refused to take singing lessons, which were part of the pre-
scribed course of study.273  In its judgment for the parents, the Su-
preme Court of Oklahoma began its analysis with a restatement of
basic common-law principles.
At common law the principal duties of parents to their legitimate children
consisted in their maintenance, their protection, and their education.  These
duties were imposed upon principles of natural law and affection laid on them
not only by Nature herself, but by their own proper act of bringing them into
the world.  It is true the municipal law took care to enforce these duties,
though Providence has done it more effectually than any law by implanting in
the breast of every parent that natural insuperable degree of affection which
not even the deformity of person or mind, not even the wickedness, ingrati-
tude, and rebellion of children, can totally suppress, or extinguish.274
Oklahoma state law was “in the main declaratory of the common law,”
and compulsory school laws had no doubt “modif[ied] more or less the
authority of the parent over the child in school matters.”275  The
Thompson court insisted that the parent’s paramount right to deter-
mine what studies his child shall pursue is consistent with the com-
mon law duty to provide children with a suitable education.276  This
selection right of the parent “is superior to that of the school officers
and the teachers.”277  Some courts deferred to school authorities
his minor children, and he has the right to enforce obedience to his commands by
moderate and reasonable chastisement.  And furthermore, it is one of the earliest
and most sacred duties taught the child, to honor and obey its parents.  The situ-
ation of the child is truly lamentable, if the condition of the law is that he is liable
to be punished by the parent for disobeying his orders in regard to his studies,
and the teacher may lawfully chastise him for not disobeying his parent in that
particular.”).
270. Id. at 66. (“It is unreasonable to suppose any scholar who attends school, can or
will study all the branches taught in them.  From the nature of the case some
choice must be made and some discretion be exercised as to the studies which the
different pupils shall pursue.  The parent is quite as likely to make a wise and
judicious selection as the teacher.”).
271. See Bd. of Educ. v Purse, 28 S.E. 896 (Ga. 1897).
272. Sch. Bd. Dist. No. 18, Garvin County v. Thompson, 103 P. 578 (Okla. 1909).
273. Id. at 578.
274. Id. at 578–79.
275. Id. at 579.
276. Id.
277. Id. at 582.  (“The school authorities of the state have the power to classify and
grade the scholars in their respective districts and cause them to be taught in
such departments as they may deem expedient.  They may also prescribe the
courses of study and text-books for the use of the schools, and such reasonable
rules and regulations as they may think needful.  They may also require prompt
attendance, respectful deportment, and diligence in study.  The parent, however,
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where the parent refused to offer any reason for his objection to a cur-
ricular requirement.278  The Thompson court, however, was not pre-
pared to make even this concession to state authority.  It thought the
better rule was “to presume, in the absence of proof to the contrary,
that the request of the parent was reasonable and just, to the best
interest of the child, and not detrimental to the discipline and effi-
ciency of the school.”279
The Thompson court was defending more than a parent’s right to
take his child out of singing lessons.  Underlying these cases was the
fear that educational authority was being made subject to what
Tiedeman called the “assumption by government of the paternal char-
acter altogether.”280  Where Blackstone saw the absolute control of
the child by the parent as barbaric, these courts saw exclusive state
control of the child as the hallmark of despotism.281  Where Kent saw
the child’s proper education as a prerequisite for social and political
engagement, these courts looked to the autonomous family as “the
keystone of the governmental structure.”282  These courts lacked
Tiedeman’s general skepticism toward the patriarchal principle, and
their vision of the home was hardly that of an educational forum
where children learned to think for themselves.  “Under our form of
government, and at common law, the home is considered the keystone
has a right to make a reasonable selection from the prescribed course of study for
his child to pursue, and this selection must be respected by the school authorities,
as the right of the parent in that regard is superior to that of the school officers
and the teachers.”); cf. Trs. of Schs. v. People ex rel. Van Allen, 87 Ill. 303 (Ill.
1877) (“[T]he policy of our law has ever been to recognize the right of the parent
to determine to what extent his child shall be educated, during minority—
presuming that his natural affections and superior opportunities of knowing the
physical and mental capabilities and future prospects of his child, will insure the
adoption of that course which will most effectually promote the child’s welfare.”).
278. See, e.g., State v. Webber, 8 N.E. 708 (Ind. 1886); State ex rel. Sheibley v. Sch.
Dist. No. 1, 31 Neb. 552, 48 N.W. 393 (Neb. 1891).
279. Thompson, 103 P. at 582.
280. TIEDEMAN, supra note 52, at vii.
281. Cf. Rulison v. Post, 79 Ill. 567, 573 (Ill. 1875) (“Parents and guardians are under
the responsibility of preparing children intrusted to their care and nurture, for
the discharge of their duties in after life.  Law-givers in all free countries, and,
with few exceptions, in despotic governments, have deemed it wise to leave the
education and nurture of the children of the State to the direction of the parent or
guardian.  This is, and has ever been, the spirit of our free institutions.  The State
has provided the means, and brought them within the reach of all, to acquire the
benefits of a common school education, but leaves it to parents and guardians to
determine the extent to which they will render it available to the children under
their charge.”).
282. Id.; cf. State ex rel. Kelley v. Ferguson, 95 Neb. 63, 74, 144 N.W. 1039, 1043 (Neb.
1914) (“But in this age of agitation, such as the world has never known before, we
want to be careful lest we carry the doctrine of governmental paternalism too far,
for, after all is said and done, the prime factor in our scheme of government is the
American home.”).
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of the governmental structure.  In this empire parents rule supreme
during the minority of their children.”283  The family as a domestic
relation was replaced by the family as a political institution, where
“the parent, and especially the father, was vested with supreme con-
trol over the child.”284  This perfectly explains the reminder of the
Wisconsin Supreme Court that God considered filial obedience a sa-
cred duty: “it is one of the earliest and most sacred duties taught the
child, to honor and obey its parents.”285
Where the subject of state authority to regulate the family had
been considered “a question, not of constitutional power for the courts,
but of expediency and propriety, which it is the sole province of the
legislature to determine,”286 the courts that upheld curricular objec-
tions were defending rights considered superior to ordinary legisla-
tion.  This defense had a strong patriarchal ring to it.  The state
simply could not take from the father his right of parental control.
The curricular requirement cases were often decided quite literally on
the principle that father knows what is best for his child:
Now who is to determine what studies she shall pursue in school,—A teacher
who has a mere temporary interest in her welfare, or her father, who may
reasonably be supposed to be desirous of pursuing such course as will best
promote the happiness of his child?  The father certainly possesses superior
opportunities of knowing the physical and mental capabilities of his child.287
But even where the best interests of the child were threatened, the
child’s rights might be considered as entirely dependent on the will of
the father.  In Board of Education v. Purse, the Supreme Court of
Georgia went so far as to uphold the suspension of a child because the
child’s parent had disrupted the classroom.288  The court acknowl-
edged that “it is hard upon the child to be deprived of the benefit of an
education because his parent will not submit himself to the reasonable
rules, regulations, practices, and customs incident to the system pro-
viding for the education of his child,”289 but the court concluded that
283. Thompson, 103 P. at 581.
284. Id. at 579.
285. Morrow v. Wood, 35 Wis. 59, 64 (Wis. 1874).
286. Cf. State v. Clottu, 33 Ind. 409, 412 (Ind. 1870) (“The subject has always been
regarded as within the purview of legislative authority.  How far this interference
should extend is a question, not of constitutional power for the courts, but of ex-
pediency and propriety, which it is the sole province of the legislature to deter-
mine.  The judiciary has no authority to interfere with this exercise of legislative
judgment; and to do so would be to invade the province which by the constitution
is assigned exclusively to the law-making power.”).
287. Kelley, 95 Neb. at 69, 144 N.W. at 1043 (quoting State v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 31 Neb.
552, 556, 48 N.W. 393, 395 (Neb. 1891)); Sch. Bd. Dist. No. 18, Garvin County v.
Thompson, 103 P. 580 (Okla. 1909) (quoting same).
288. Bd. of Educ. v. Purse, 28 S.E. 896 (Ga. 1897).  Though the mother had caused the
disruption, under state law the wife had no legal existence of her own. Id. at 902.
Thus, her husband was responsible for her conduct. Id.
289. Id. at 900.
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to grant the child an independent right to an education would be to
undermine the supreme control of the father.  In a remarkable rever-
sal of the idea that the parent’s duty to educate his child is owed to the
state, the Purse court concluded that the public ought not to be de-
prived of the benefits of parental absolutism.
It would be contrary to the policy of our law, based, as it is, upon the common
law, to bestow upon the child, in the matter of its education, any right inde-
pendent of the parent.  It needs no argument to sustain the proposition that
the father is, and ought to be, the head of the family, and the public has the
right to look to him to control his children.  A law which would take from him
this control, and deprive the public of the benefits to be derived from such
control, would be in conflict with our established institutions.290
To reach this conclusion, the Purse court, like other courts that
struck down curricular education requirements, had to read the com-
mon law in absolutist terms.  The child was no worse off, according to
the court, than he would have been at common law.  The common law
left the child completely at the mercy of the parent’s will, so far as obtaining
an education was concerned; in fact, the status of the child is the same.  At
common law he was at the mercy of an arbitrary parent whether he should be
placed at school or not; placed at school in [the state of] Georgia he is still at
the mercy of an arbitrary parent, who may so conduct himself as to deprive
the child of the benefits to be derived from an education.291
By ceding to the parent a “paramount right” to select courses from the
prescribed state curriculum, the courts created the right they pur-
ported to find, a right to contract the spectrum of available knowledge
and to forbid the acquisition of useful learning.  However, the common
law did not propose a legal regime that made children’s educational
best interests secondary to parental rights.  Not only was the matter
of education “deemed a legitimate function of the state,” parental cus-
tody itself was made “to depend upon considerations of moral fitness
in the parent to be entrusted with the formation of the character of his
own offspring.”292  Thus, consistent with common law principles, state
compulsory attendance statutes not only set minimal educational re-
quirements for the public schools, but also required private schools to
offer “equivalent instruction.”293  In the half-century before Meyer and
290. Id.
291. Id.
292. State v. Clottu, 33 Ind. 409, 412 (Ind. 1870).
293. See, e.g., Hardwick v. Bd. of Sch. Trs., 205 P. 49 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1921) (“To the
end that the public school system may in full measure function according to its
purposes, there must, of course, be rules and regulations for the government
thereof, and these the Legislature has either directly provided or has vested the
school authorities with plenary power to establish and, quite naturally and with
eminent propriety, has committed to said authorities the right and power to pre-
scribe the courses of study to be followed in the various grades of the system and
to maintain at all times the discipline indispensably necessary to the successful
prosecution of the high purposes thereof.”); State ex rel. Andrews v. Webber, 8
N.E. 708, 712 (Ind. 1886) (“It cannot be doubted, we think, that the legislature
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Pierce, the courts tended to defer to the regulatory discretion of school
authorities (the curricular requirements cases notwithstanding), a
trend that would finally result in state efforts to require attendance at
public schools only.
In 1919, Nebraska and sixteen other states passed statutes prohib-
iting the teaching of foreign languages in private as well as public
schools.294  To the Nebraska Supreme Court, hearing a challenge to
the state language prohibition law, the salutary purpose of the legisla-
tion was clear and well within the sphere of the state’s police
power.295  In dissent, Judge Charles B. Letton protested that the mea-
sure upset the proper allocation of educational control between parent
and state.296  Citing one of the curricular requirement cases, Letton
conceded that the state could manage and control private schools, but
the state had no right “to prevent parents from bestowing upon their
children a full measure of education in addition to the state required
branches.”297
Has it the right to prevent the study of music, of drawing, of handiwork, in
classes or private schools, under the guise of police power?  If not, it has no
power to prevent the study of French, Spanish, Italian, or any other foreign or
classic language, unless such study interferes with the education in the lan-
guage of our country, prescribed by the statute.298
has given the trustees of the public school corporations the discretionary power to
direct, from time to time, what branches of learning, in addition to those specified
in the statute, shall be taught in the public schools of their respective corpora-
tions.); cf. Bd. of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 245–46 (1968) (“[A] substantial
body of case law has confirmed the power of the States to insist that attendance
at private schools, if it is to satisfy state compulsory-attendance laws, be at insti-
tutions which provide minimum hours of instruction, employ teachers of specified
training, and cover prescribed subjects of instruction.”).
294. On the language prohibition statutes, see Woodhouse, supra note 12, at 1004 (“By
1923, thirty-one states had laws mandating English as the sole language of in-
struction either in public or in all schools.  These language laws sprang, in some
measure, from anti-German bias of the war years.  They were rooted, however, in
a more enduring conflict—the struggle between cultural pluralism and the felt
need to articulate a national identity, evident in the long-standing tensions be-
tween English-speaking settlers of the Midwest and the large German, Polish,
and Scandinavian communities in these states.  These immigrant groups often
formed isolated cultural enclaves with clubs, parochial schools, ethnic parishes,
banks, stores, and insurance companies in which all business was conducted in
the language of the home country.  To their American-born neighbors, coming
from a tradition that mixed the meliorative, unifying strains of populism and pro-
gressivism with a nativist distrust for anything foreign, this failure to assimilate
seemed at once a threat and a challenge for progressive reform.”) (footnotes
omitted).
295. Meyer v. State, 107 Neb. 657, 187 N.W. 100 (Neb. 1922).
296. Id. at 667–68, 187 N.W. at 104–05 (Letton, J., dissenting)
297. Id. at 668, 187 N.W. at 104.
298. Id.
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In dissent, Judge Letton relied on State ex rel. Kelley v. Ferguson,299
in which the Nebraska Supreme Court upheld a parent’s paramount
right to select what classes he wanted his child to take from the state-
prescribed course of studies.  In Kelley, the parent had objected to his
child’s attendance at a domestic science class.300  Judge Letton con-
curred, but in the judgment only.  Unwilling “to go so far [as did the
majority] with respect to the right of parental control,” Letton based
his decision in Kelley on the fact that domestic science was not a
“plainly essential” course.301  He would extend the right of parental
control “only to such studies as are not plainly essential or which are
not at least impliedly required to be taught in the grade of school in
which the pupil may enroll.”302
In effect, Judge Letton was trying to accommodate the competing
concerns of parent and state.  Under the common law composite model
of parent–child relations, parents had no right to prevent the state
from setting minimal educational requirements.  Conversely, under
the curricular requirement cases, parents possessed a veto power over
the state-mandated curriculum, and this threatened to upset the bal-
ance of power in favor of parental control.  From these two alterna-
tives, Judge Letton ultimately supported the state’s authority, though
he would have limited it to mandatory subjects.303  However, Judge
Letton indicated that no principle of law gave the state authority to
prevent parents from teaching their children subjects “in addition to
the state required branches.”304  Thus, when Nebraska passed its lan-
guage prohibition statute, the balance of power was upset in favor of
state control.  Here, Judge Letton drew his line, knowing that it would
likely fall to the United States Supreme Court to sort out the proper
allocation of educational control between parent and state.
III. MEYER AND PIERCE: PARENTING, EDUCATION, AND
THE RHETORIC OF RIGHTS
The Pierce Court famously pronounced that the child is not the
mere creature of the state.305  It is a curiously understated proposi-
tion.  When Pierce is read against the history of custody case law, how-
299. State ex rel. Kelley v. Ferguson, 95 Neb. 63, 144 N.W. 1039 (Neb. 1914).
300. See id. at 64, 144 N.W. at 1040.
301. Id. at 75, 144 N.W. at 1044 (Letton, J., concurring in conclusion only).
302. Id.
303. Id.
304. Meyer, 107 Neb. at 668, 187 N.W. at 104 (Letton, J., dissenting) (“The state . . .
has no right to prevent parents from bestowing upon their children a full mea-
sure of education in addition to the state required branches.  Has it the right to
prevent the study of music, of drawing, of handiwork, in classes or private
schools, under the guise of police power?”).
305. Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus & Mary, 268 U.S. 510, 535
(1925).
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ever, the defensiveness of the Court’s posture makes good sense, for
the courts had consistently maintained that the child is “primarily a
ward of the state.”306 Meyer and Pierce have been read to state broad
claims about the fundamental nature of parental rights, but, in fact,
they stand for a much more modest proposition: that the state does
not have exclusive authority over the child’s education, and, more par-
ticularly, that the state cannot prohibit parents from teaching their
children subject matter outside the scope of a state-mandated
curriculum.307
The fear that the state was claiming exclusive control of the child’s
education was a theme of the curricular requirement cases.  Accord-
ingly, the Wisconsin Supreme Court asked, “Whence, we again in-
quire, did the teacher derive this exclusive and paramount authority
over the child, and the right to direct his studies contrary to the wish
of the father?”308  For those courts eager to see the pendulum of edu-
cational authority swing back to the parent, the answer was to grant
parents the right to keep the child from taking subjects required by
school authorities.  Importantly, in the curricular requirements cases,
the state was not prohibiting parents from teaching their children
subject matter beyond that required by the state or prohibiting par-
ents from teaching their children outside the public school setting.
However, this is precisely what the state wanted to do in Meyer and
Pierce.  In Meyer, the state wanted to prohibit the teaching of modern
foreign languages to children in the primary grades of all schools, pub-
lic and private.309  In effect, the state was claiming the authority to
establish a curricular monopoly.  In Pierce, the monopoly demanded
by the state was institutional.  The state wanted to prohibit private
schooling for children between ages eight and sixteen.310  In both
cases, the Supreme Court was driven by a passionate concern “lest the
state carry the doctrine of government paternalism too far.”311  How-
ever, the Court did not grant parents the right to reject state curricu-
lar requirements.  As expressed in later opinions, the Court merely
granted parents, in Meyer, the right to do something in addition to
what the public schools required, and, in Pierce, “the right . . . to pro-
vide an equivalent education in a privately operated system.”312
306. See, e.g., Allison v. Bryan, 97 P. 282, 286 (Okla. 1908).
307. The secondary literature on Meyer and Pierce is voluminous.  On the historical
background, see generally David B. Tyack, The Perils of Pluralism: The Back-
ground of the Pierce Case, 74 AM. HIST. REV. 74 (1968); Woodhouse, supra note
12.
308. Morrow v. Wood, 35 Wis. 59, 65 (1874).
309. See Meyer, 107 Neb. 657, 187 N.W. 100.
310. See Pierce, 268 U.S. at 530–31.
311. State ex rel. Kelley v. Ferguson, 95 Neb. 63, 74, 144 N.W. 1039, 1044 (Neb. 1914).
312. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213 (1972) (“Providing public schools ranks at
the very apex of the function of a State. Yet even this paramount responsibility
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Neither Meyer nor Pierce rejects the statist notion that the govern-
ment can enforce the parental duty to educate.  The Meyer Court did
not question the authority of the state “to compel attendance at some
school and to make reasonable regulations for all schools, including a
requirement that they shall give instructions in English.”313  In
Pierce, the Court pointedly noted that the case raised no question
“concerning the power of the state reasonably to regulate all schools,”
and that the power of the state included a good deal of curricular con-
trol—“that certain studies plainly essential to good citizenship must
be taught, and that nothing be taught which is manifestly inimical to
the public welfare.”314  The question that these cases both consider is
how far the state can go in dictating what the parent can do. Meyer
teaches that the state may not set up a standard of education for chil-
dren and prohibit any additional instruction.315  The court’s reasoning
was based on the arbitrariness of the language prohibition.  That is,
“the mere knowledge of [a foreign] language could not reasonably be
regarded as harmful.”316  Thus, in proscribing foreign language in-
struction in private schools, the legislature exceeded its police pow-
ers.317  The Court agreed with the plaintiff that, unless the teaching of
a subject is so clearly harmful “as to justify its inhibition,”318 the par-
ent has a right to supplement the state’s educational offerings.  To put
it simply, the parent cannot be prohibited from teaching his child sub-
jects in addition to those required by the state.  If there is a fundamen-
tal right at stake in Meyer, it is the right of the parent, “after he has
complied with all proper requirements by the state as to education, to
was, in Pierce, made to yield to the right of parents to provide an equivalent edu-
cation in a privately operated system.”).
313. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 402 (1923).
314. Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus & Mary, 268 U.S. 510, 534
(1925); cf. Bd. of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 247 (1968) (“[I]f the State must
satisfy its interest in secular education through the instrument of private schools,
it has a proper interest in the manner in which those schools perform their secu-
lar educational function.”).
315. See Meyer, 262 U.S. 390.
316. Id. at 400.
317. Id. at 403; see also Nebraska Dist. of Evangelical Lutheran Synod v. McKelvie,
108 Neb. 448, 455, 187 N.W. 927, 930 (Neb. 1922) (Morrissey, C.J., dissenting) (“I
cannot regard as a reasonable exercise of the police power a provision which arbi-
trarily forbids the acquisition of useful learning—learning that is not harmful in
itself, learning that the well to do parent may employ a private tutor to impart to
his child, or that the cultured parent may personally impart to his child, if not
done in a school.  The police power has never been held to extend to the prohibi-
tion of acts not injurious to society or which cannot reasonably be said to be
harmful to the public welfare.  It is an arbitrary classification which reason will
not support.”).
318. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 403.
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give his child such further education in proper subjects as he desires
and can afford.”319
This is the narrow right for which Arthur T. Mullen, on behalf of
the plaintiff Robert T. Meyer, argued before the Court.  Mullen was
careful to “concede the power of the State to require the study of En-
glish, under the police power.”320  Yet, he was unwilling to “concede
for a moment that the legislature has the power, when we comply with
the curriculum of study prescribed by the State, to deny us the right to
teach a foreign language as an optional subject.”321  What the plaintiff
wanted was the “right to teach these foreign languages and other
branches in addition to the curriculum required by the public
schools.”322  If such teaching did not disrupt the required curriculum,
Mullen argued, there was no sound reason under the police power to
prohibit it:
The only objection they can make to the teaching of foreign languages in a
private or parochial school is this: I can conceive that, if it was done in such a
way as to interfere with the regular course of study, there might be reasonable
objection to it.  But when we get above the minimum requirements in our
State, qualifications of teachers, equipment, and everything else, it is none of
the State’s business what we teach the child, so long as we do not teach it
sedition, or something of that kind.  We have a right to teach any useful or
harmless study—gymnastics, dancing, or anything else; and languages as
well as anything else—because there is nothing inherently bad about learning
a foreign language.323
Central to the argument was whether the statute merely regulated
or actually prohibited the teaching of foreign languages.  On this
point, both sides agreed that teaching children while they were young
was the key to educational success.  The State argued that the law
was regulatory in character,324 noting that the statute did not “forbid
the use of foreign languages by persons of maturity or prevent the
study of foreign languages by persons who have passed the eighth
319. Meyer v. State, 107 Neb. 657, 667, 187 N.W. 100, 104 (Neb. 1922) (Letton, J.,
dissenting); cf. Berea College v. Kentucky, 211 U.S. 45, 67 (1908) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting) (“The capacity to impart instruction to others is given by the Al-
mighty for beneficent purposes and its use may not be forbidden or interfered
with by Government,—certainly not, unless such instruction is, in its nature,
harmful to the public morals or imperils the public safety.”).
320. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 17, at 14.
321. Id.
322. Id.
323. Id. at 15.
324. Brief and Argument of State of Nebraska, Defendant in Error at 14–15, Meyer v.
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (No. 325) (“If it is within the police power of the
state to regulate wages, to legislate respecting housing conditions in crowded cit-
ies, to prohibit dark rooms in tenement houses, to compel landlords to place win-
dows in their tenements which will enable their tenants to enjoy the sunshine, it
is within the police power of the state to compel every resident on Nebraska to so
educate his children that the sunshine of American ideals will permeate the life
of the future citizens of this republic.”).
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grade.”325  The purpose of the law was “to prevent children reared in
America from being trained and educated in foreign languages and
foreign ideals before they have had an opportunity to learn the En-
glish language and observe American ideals.”326  The State’s concern
was based on the “well known fact that the language first learned by a
child remains his mother tongue and the language of his heart.”327  By
forcing children to wait until they passed the eighth grade, the law
worked “to insure that the English language shall be the mother
tongue and the language of the heart of the children reared in this
country who will eventually become the citizens of this country.”328
The plaintiff fully agreed with the State’s pedagogical premises.  How-
ever, artfully drawing upon Pharaoh’s edict to the Hebrews to make
bricks without straw,329 attorney Mullen countered that because the
law prohibited children from studying a foreign language “when they
are most impressionable,”330 it amounted to a total prohibition on for-
eign language instruction.331  “[I]t is more difficult for a child to learn
a language after it gets into high school than it is in the lower grades;
and [the statute’s] purpose is to discourage the study of foreign lan-
guages; that is the only theory upon which it was enacted.”332
The Meyer Court accepted the argument that the statute imposed a
blanket prohibition on the ability of parents to supplement the re-
quired curriculum with foreign language instruction.333  It noted that
“[p]ractically, education of the young is only possible in schools con-
ducted by especially qualified persons who devote themselves
thereto.”334 Thus, the law was really a de facto ban.  In his amicus
brief, William Guthrie pointed the Court to Adams v. Tanner335 for
325. Id. at 12.
326. Id. at 12–13.
327. Id. at 13.
328. Id.
329. See Exodus 5.
330. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 17, at 14.
331. Id. at 14–15 (“[T]he theory of requiring a child to study a language at a period of
its life when it is more difficult for it to learn is the same theory that was invoked
by the Pharaos, when they required their subjects ‘to make bricks without straw,’
there is no doubt about it; what they were trying to do is to prevent the study of
foreign languages, and the use of foreign languages . . . .”).
332. Id.  The argument about regulation versus prohibition was doubly important be-
cause Oregon’s recent enactment of a statute prohibiting private schooling for the
primary grades was effectively a secondary object of the Court’s deliberations.
Before the Court, Mullen repeatedly made what amounted to a slippery slope
argument: the prohibition of foreign language teaching had already led to the
prohibition of private schools. See id. at 8–10.
333. See Brief for William D. Guthrie & Bernard Hershkopf as Amici Curiae Support-
ing Plaintiff-in-Error, supra note 15, at 7.
334. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400 (1923).
335. 244 U.S. 590 (1917).  In Adams, the Court struck down a state law prohibiting
the collection by employment agencies of fees from applicants for work.  Con-
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the proposition that “mere abuse incident to an occupation ordinarily
useful is not enough to justify its abolition, although regulation may
be entirely proper.”336  Relying on Adams, the Court held that without
an emergency that would justify a prohibition on foreign language
teaching, the state law was without “reasonable relation to any end
within the competency of the State.”337  Similarly, the Pierce Court
found that private schools were not harmful, that the result of enforc-
ing the state legislation would be the destruction of private schools,
and, finally, that there was no emergency to justify the State’s exclu-
sive institutional control of the child’s education.338
If the doctrinal results of Meyer and Pierce are modest, the same
cannot be said of the Court’s rhetoric.  Like the courts in the curricular
requirements cases, the Court paid homage to “rights long freely en-
vinced that the statute was one of prohibition rather than regulation, the Court
found that the law had “no just relation to the protection of the public within the
scope of legislative power.” Id. at 596–97.  The real issue in Adams was state
regulation of the marketplace and the Court’s fear that “[s]killfully directed agi-
tation” would interfere with one’s right “to follow a distinctly useful calling in an
upright way”:
Because abuses may, and probably do, grow up in connection with this
business, is adequate reason for hedging it about by proper regulations.
But this is not enough to justify destruction of one’s right to follow a
distinctly useful calling in an upright way.  Certainly there is no profes-
sion, possibly no business, which does not offer peculiar opportunities for
reprehensible practices; and as to every one of them, no doubt, some can
be found quite ready earnestly to maintain that its suppression would be
in the public interest.  Skillfully directed agitation might also bring
about apparent condemnation of any one of them by the public.  Happily
for all, the fundamental guaranties of the Constitution cannot be freely
submerged if and whenever some ostensible justification is advanced
and the police power invoked.
Id. at 594–95.
336. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 403.
337. Id.  But see Bartles v. Iowa, 262 U.S. 404, 412 (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“It is with
hesitation and unwillingness that I differ from my brethren with regard to a law
like this but I cannot bring my mind to believe that in some circumstances, and
circumstances existing it is said in Nebraska, the statute might not be regarded
as a reasonable or even necessary method of reaching the desired result.  The
part of the act with which we are concerned deals with the teaching of young
children.  Youth is the time when familiarity with a language is established and
if there are sections in the State where a child would hear only Polish or French
or German spoken at home I am not prepared to say that it is unreasonable to
provide that in his early years he shall hear and speak only English at school.”).
338. Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus & Mary, 268 U.S. 510, 534
(1925). (“The inevitable practical result of enforcing the act under consideration
would be destruction of appellees’ primary schools, and perhaps all other private
primary schools for normal children within the state of Oregon.  Appellees are
engaged in a kind of undertaking not inherently harmful, but long regarded as
useful and meritorious.  Certainly there is nothing in the present records to indi-
cate that they have failed to discharge their obligations to patrons, students, or
the state.  And there are no peculiar circumstances or present emergencies which
demand extraordinary measures relative to primary education.”).
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joyed.”339  The thematic thrust of the Court’s opinions was its fear of a
brave new world where the state would indoctrinate children in a
standardized state-endorsed ideology.340  While the anti-statist rheto-
ric of Meyer and Pierce would long resonate with those seeking to
make education an essentially private, parenting matter, these cases
cannot be made to support the claim that parental rights are funda-
mental.341  The Court set an outer limit to the state’s authority to
limit the child’s access to educational options.  The state cannot
“standardize its children by forcing them to accept instruction from
public teachers only.”342  Yet, while “[t]he child is not the mere crea-
339. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 403.
340. Id. at 401–02; Pierce, 268 U.S. at 535 (“The fundamental theory of liberty upon
which all governments in this Union repose excludes any general power of the
state to standardize its children by forcing them to accept instruction from public
teachers only.”).
341. See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166–67 (1944) (“[N]either rights of
religion nor rights of parenthood are beyond limitation.  Acting to guard the gen-
eral interest in youth’s well being, the state as parens patriae may restrict the
parent’s control by requiring school attendance, regulating or prohibiting the
child’s labor and in many other ways.  Its authority is not nullified merely be-
cause the parent grounds his claim to control the child’s course of conduct on
religion or conscience.  Thus, he cannot claim freedom from compulsory vaccina-
tion for the child more than for himself on religious grounds.  The right to prac-
tice religion freely does not include liberty to expose the community or the child
to communicable disease or the latter to ill health or death.  The catalogue need
not be lengthened.  It is sufficient to show what indeed appellant hardly disputes,
that the state has a wide range of power for limiting parental freedom and au-
thority in things affecting the child’s welfare; and that this includes, to some ex-
tent, matters of conscience and religious conviction.”) (footnotes omitted)
(citations omitted); Baker v, Owen, 395 F. Supp. 294, 299 (M.D.N.C. 1975) (“We
reject Mrs. Baker’s suggestion that this right is fundamental, and that the state
can punish her child corporally only if it shows a compelling interest that out-
weighs her parental right.  We do not read Meyer and Pierce to enshrine parental
rights so high in the hierarchy of constitutional values.  In each case the parental
right prevailed not because the Court termed it fundamental and the state’s in-
terest uncompelling, but because the Court considered the state’s action to be
arbitrary, without reasonable relation to an end legitimately within its power.
Nor has the Court subsequently spoken of parental rights as fundamental; on the
contrary, its references to them lend support to the view that they are not.”) (cita-
tions omitted), judgment aff’d per curiam, Baker v. Owen, 423 U.S. 907 (1975); cf.
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 233 (1972) (distinguishing cases “where noth-
ing more than the general interest of the parent in the nurture and education of
his children is involved” from cases where “the interests of parenthood are com-
bined with a free exercise claim”).
342. Pierce, 268 U.S. at 535; cf. Leebaert v. Harrington, 332 F.3d 134, 140–41 (2d Cir.
2003); Swanson v. Guthrie Ind. Sch. Dist. No. I-L, 135 F.3d 694 (10th Cir. 1998);
Brown v. Hot, Sexy & Safer Prods., Inc., 68 F.3d 525, 533–34 (1st Cir. 1995) (“The
Meyer and Pierce cases, we think, evince the principle that the state cannot pre-
vent parents from choosing a specific educational program—whether it be relig-
ious instruction at a private school or instruction in a foreign language.  That is,
the state does not have the power to ‘standardize its children’ or ‘foster a homoge-
nous people’ by completely foreclosing the opportunity of individuals and groups
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ture of the state,” the right of parents to direct the education of their
children is “coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him
for additional obligations.”343  This is the contingent right so deeply
embedded in the history of custody law.  Fearful that the state was
claiming exclusive educational authority, the Court swung the par-
ent–child pendulum back to its customary position, restoring the com-
posite system that had prevailed since the time of Blackstone.
IV. RELIGIOUS PARENTING AND EDUCATIONAL
ENFRANCHISEMENT
If courts took seriously the longstanding legal principle that the
parent is only entrusted with the child’s educational welfare, some
hard cases might be subject to more principled decision making.  More
specifically, the courts should look skeptically at any educational pro-
gram, whether imposed by the parent or by the state, that restricts
the spectrum of knowledge available to the child.344  If courts sought
to heed the Supreme Court’s admonition that “ ‘students must always
remain free to inquire, to study and to evaluate,’”345 they would have
a surer compass when adjudicating conflicts between the competing
claims of parent and state to direct the education of young children.
to choose a different path of education. . . .  We think it is fundamentally different
for the state to say to a parent, ‘You can’t teach your child German or send him to
a parochial school,’ than for the parent to say to the state, ‘You can’t teach my
child subjects that are morally offensive to me.’  The first instance involves the
state proscribing parents from educating their children, while the second involves
parents prescribing what the state shall teach their children.”) (citations
omitted).
343. Pierce, 268 U.S. at 535; see Yoder, 406 U.S. at 233 (“The duty to prepare the child
for ‘additional obligations,’ referred to by the Court, must be read to include the
inculcation of moral standards, religious beliefs, and elements of good citizen-
ship.”); Prince, 321 U.S. at 166 (“It is cardinal with us that the custody, care and
nurture of the child reside first in the parents, whose primary function and free-
dom include preparation for obligations the state can neither supply nor
hinder.”).
344. On children’s intellectual rights, see generally David Moshman, Children’s Intel-
lectual Rights: A First Amendment Analysis, in CHILDREN’S INTELLECTUAL RIGHTS
25 (David Moshman ed., 1986); Harvey Siegel, Critical Thinking as an Intellec-
tual Right, in CHILDREN’S INTELLECTUAL RIGHTS 39 (David Moshman ed., 1986);
but compare with Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 245 (1972) (Douglas, J., dis-
senting in part) (“It is the future of the student, not the future of the parents, that
is imperiled by today’s decision.  If a parent keeps his child out of school beyond
the grade school, then the child will be forever barred from entry into the new
and amazing world of diversity that we have today.  The child may decide that
that is the preferred course, or he may rebel.  It is the student’s judgment, not his
parents’, that is essential if we are to give full meaning to what we have said
about the Bill of Rights and of the right of students to be masters of their own
destiny.”).
345. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 487 (1960) (quoting Sweezy v. New Hampshire,
354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957)).
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On this basis, for example, the courts should uphold the prohibi-
tion of homeschooling arrangements that are too socially reclusive.
Home instruction should provide an education that is more than
merely the academic equivalent of the public schools, and some courts
have decided that social isolation can be its own form of intellectual
incapacitation.  Where the geography of education sequesters the
child from divergent points of view, the state has a compelling interest
in “removing the child from the immediate family for his or her educa-
tion.  By bringing children into contact with some person, other than
those in the excluded group, those children are exposed to at least one
other set of attitudes, values, morals, lifestyles and intellectual abili-
ties.”346  Isolation may involve separation from other children, or it
may also involve separation from other adults, including teachers,
who can offer a non-parental role model that the Supreme Court has
deemed “crucial to the continued good health of a democracy.”347  In
346. State v. Edgington, 663 P.2d 374, 378 (N.M. Ct. App. 1983); cf. MEIRA LEVINSON,
THE DEMANDS OF LIBERAL EDUCATION 58 (1999) (arguing that “it is difficult for
children to achieve autonomy solely within the bounds of their families and home
communities—or even within the bounds of schools whose norms are constituted
by those held by the child’s home community”); Brighouse, supra note 44, at 244
(“[T]he state has an obligation to ensure that every child has a full opportunity to
become personally autonomous.”); Emily Buss, The Adolescent’s Stake in the Allo-
cation of Educational Control between Parent and State, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 1233
(2000) (suggesting that compulsory public education might be applied universally
in order for the state to facilitate adolescent associational activity with unlike
peers); Rob Reich, Testing the Boundaries of Parental Authority over Education:
The Case of Homeschooling, in MORAL AND POLITICAL EDUCATION 275, 299 (Ste-
phen Macedo & Yael Tamir eds., 2002) (“I submit that even in a minimal con-
strual of autonomy, it must be the function of the school setting to expose
children to and engage children with values and beliefs other than those of their
parents.  To achieve minimal autonomy require that a child know that there are
ways of life other than that into which he or she has been born.  Minimal auton-
omy requires, especially for its civic importance, that the child be able to examine
his or her own political values and beliefs, and those of others, with a critical eye.
It requires that a child be able to think independently.  If this is all true, then at a
bare minimum, the structure of schooling cannot replicate in every particularity
the values and beliefs of a child’s home.”) (footnote omitted). But see, e.g., Ste-
phen G. Gilles, On Educating Children: A Parentalist Manifesto, 63 U. CHI. L.
REV. 937 (1996) (defending a broad conception of parental educational authority).
347. Ambach v. Norwich, 441 U.S. 68, 78–79 (1968) (“Within the public school system,
teachers play a critical part in developing students’ attitude toward government
and understanding of the role of citizens in our society.  Alone among employees
of the system, teachers are in direct, day-to-day contact with students both in the
classrooms and in the other varied activities of a modern school.  In shaping the
students’ experience to achieve educational goals, teachers by necessity have
wide discretion over the way the course material is communicated to students. . . .
Further, a teacher serves as a role model for his students, exerting a subtle but
important influence over their perceptions and values.  Thus, through both the
presentation of course materials and the example he sets, a teacher has an oppor-
tunity to influence the attitudes of students toward government, the political pro-
cess, and a citizen’s social responsibilities.  This influence is crucial to the
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any event, as one state supreme court concluded, the state has a duty
to ensure that children are not “released upon the world only after
their opportunities to acquire basic skills have been foreclosed and
their capacity to cope with modern society has been so undermined as
to prohibit useful, happy or productive lives.”348
On this basis, too, the courts should refuse to allow public school
parents to opt-out of educational programs they consider objectiona-
ble.  In cases like this, the parent denies the child an opportunity to
learn about other viewpoints, religious or secular.  The child is si-
lenced, as it were, by default.  The most well-known example of such a
case is Mozert v. Hawkins County Board of Education, where parents
had religious objections to a prescribed set of reading textbooks used
as part of a school-wide critical reading program.349  The parents’ re-
continued good health of a democracy.”) (footnotes omitted); see also Bethel Sch.
Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683 (1986) (“Consciously or otherwise,
teachers—and indeed the older students—demonstrate the appropriate form of
civil discourse and political expression by their conduct and deportment in and
out of class.  Inescapably, like parents, they are role models.”).
348. State v. Riddle, 285 S.E. 2d 359, 366 (W. Va. 1981).  The defendants were “Bibli-
cal Christians” who, according to the court, “[were] determined to have their chil-
dren totally indoctrinated and educated in their religious beliefs, with no
smattering of heresy.” Id. at 361.  The parents “never requested the county su-
perintendent of schools to approve their home as a place for instruction,” as re-
quired by law. Id. at 363.  With less than abundant generosity of spirit, the court
thought it was
inconceivable that in the twentieth century the free exercise clause of
the first amendment implies that children can lawfully be sequestered
on a rural homestead during all of their formative years to be released
upon the world only after their opportunities to acquire basic skills have
been foreclosed and their capacity to cope with modern society has been
so undermined as to prohibit useful, happy or productive lives.
Id. at 366; see also State v. Hoyt, 146 A. 170, 170–71 (N.H. 1929) (“Education in
public schools is considered by many to furnish desirable and even essential
training for citizenship, apart from that gained by the study of books.  The associ-
ation with those of all classes of society, at an early age and upon a common level,
is not unreasonably urged as a preparation for discharging the duties of a citi-
zen.”); Knox v. O’Brien, 72 A.2d 389, 392 (Cape May Cnty. Ct., N.J. 1950) (“Clois-
ter and shelter have its place, but not in the every day give and take of life. . . .
The entire lack of free association with other children being denied to [the
O’Brien children], by design or otherwise, which is afforded them at public school,
leads me to the conclusion that they are not receiving education equivalent to
that provided in the public schools in the third and fifth grades.”). But see State
v. Massa, 231 A.2d 252, 255 (Morris Cnty. Ct., N.J. 1967) (“The Legislature must
have contemplated that a child could be educated alone provided the education
was equivalent to the public schools.  Conditions in today’s society illustrate that
such situations exist.  Examples are the child prodigy whose education is acceler-
ated by private tutoring, or the infant performer whose education is provided by
private tutoring.”).
349. 827 F.2d 1058, 1059 (6th Cir. 1987); see also Parker v. Hurley, 514 F.3d 87 (1st
Cir. 2008) (challenge to books portraying diverse families); Leebaert v. Harring-
ton, 332 F.3d 134 (2d Cir. 2003) (requiring health education classes); Immediato
v. Rye Neck School Dist., 873 F. Supp. 846 (2d. Cir. 1996) (community service);
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ligious beliefs compelled them to refrain from exposing their children
to viewpoints not consistent with strict adherence to biblical teach-
ing,350 and, accordingly, they sought to opt-out of the reading pro-
gram.351  The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit concluded that
mere exposure to opposing viewpoints did not create an impermissible
burden on the students’ exercise of their religion, reasoning (1) that
the reading curriculum did not contain religious or anti-religious
messages, and (2) that participation did not require students “to af-
firm or deny a religious belief or to engage or refrain from engaging in
a practice forbidden or required in the exercise of a plaintiff’s relig-
ion.”352  This is a weak and doctrinally dangerous—and unneces-
sary—line of reasoning.353  While public school officials may refuse to
shield a young child from exposure to diverse viewpoints, some of
which might be offensive to the child’s personal religious beliefs, they
may not do so because such exposure is unburdensome, but because
the state has a compelling interest in creating a curriculum that truly
trains children through wide exposure to a robust exchange of
ideas.354
The state’s interest is more than a matter of administrative conve-
nience.  It is the protection of “the prospective interest in personal sov-
ereignty our children have.”355  Compulsory education requirements
presuppose “sympathetic and critical engagement with beliefs and
ways of life at odds with the culture of the family or religious or ethnic
Brown v. Hot, Sexy & Safer Prods., Inc., 68 F.3d 525, 533 (1st Cir. 1995) (chal-
lenge to sex education); Fleischfresser v. Dirs. of Sch. Dist. 200, 15 F.3d 680 (7th
Cir. 1994) (supplemental reading program).  On the background to Mozert, see
generally STEPHEN BATES, BATTLEGROUND: ONE MOTHER’S CRUSADE, THE RELIG-
IOUS RIGHT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR CONTROL OF OUR CLASSROOMS (1993).  On opt-
out cases and liberal education, compare, for example, MACEDO, supra note 28, at
298–99, and CALLAN, supra note 28, at 132–61, with, for example, GALSTON,
supra note 37, at 110–23; Nomi Maya Stolzenberg, “He Drew a Circle that Shut
Me Out”: Assimilation, Indoctrination, and the Paradox of Liberal Education, 106
HARV. L. REV. 581 (1993); and Sanford Levinson, The Confrontation of Religious
Faith and Civil Religion: Catholics Becoming Justices, 39 DEPAUL L. REV. 1047
(1990).
350. Vicki Frost, one of the lead plaintiffs, testified “that she did not want her children
to make critical judgments and exercise choices in areas where the Bible provides
the answer.” See Mozert, 827 F.2d at 1069.
351. Id.
352. Id.
353. See, e.g., Ira C. Lupu, Where Rights Begin: The Problem of Burdens on the Free
Exercise of Religion, 102 HARV. L. REV. 933 (1989) (finding that application of the
substantial burden doctrine “creates an intolerable risk of discrimination against
unconventional religious practices and beliefs, and threatens to narrow the pro-
tection of religious liberty overall”).
354. Mozert, 827 F.2d at 1071 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (concluding that the state had
a compelling interest in having students “read and discuss complex, morally and
socially difficult issues”).
355. CALLAN, supra note 28, at 152.
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group into which the child is born.”356  They entail the effort to foster
respect for difference and a willingness to entertain, if only for the
sake of argument, ideas that go against the familial grain.  Respect for
difference does not presuppose the child’s rejection of his primary cul-
ture—just the opposite may be the case.  The classroom should be a
place where the child’s primary commitments can be strengthened.
What compulsory education requirements ensure is that, at a mini-
mum, the child learns that there are choices to be made and that no
source of authority—parent or teacher—has the right to deny some-
one else the capacity to make critical judgments.  This, for Eamonn
Callan, is the lesson of the great sphere.
The lesson it teaches is that each of us must learn to ask the question of how
we should live, and that how we answer it can be no servile echo of the an-
swers others have given, even if our thoughts commonly turn out to be sub-
stantially the same as those that informed our parents’ lives.  Agreement with
those we love, even when it is in large part due to a concord of thought and
feeling that love has fed, is not the same as ethical servility.357
The case of Turk Leebaert and his son Corky illustrates the
point.358  Mr. Leebaert wanted his son excused from attending health
education classes required as part of the seventh-grade public-school
curriculum.359  By law, Leebaert was permitted to excuse his child
from classes related to family-life instruction or AIDS education.360
However, Leebaert contended that health education was really a mat-
ter of “character development education,” a subject that properly be-
longs only to the parent.361  For Leebaert, the right of the parent to
mold his child’s moral character was a matter of religious faith: “I be-
lieve that God has empowered human beings with the right to bring
their children up with correct moral principles in dealing with the is-
sues taught in this course, not the school system.”362  Leebaert had no
objection to “normal curriculum subjects,”363 but relying on the curric-
ular requirement cases of the late nineteenth and early twentieth cen-
turies, Leebaert argued that where the public school curriculum
356. Id. at 154–55.
357. CALLAN, supra note 28, at 154–55; cf. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 239
(1972) (White, J., concurring) (“A State has a legitimate interest not only in seek-
ing to develop the latent talents of its children but also in seeking to prepare
them for the life style that they may later choose, or at least to provide them with
an option other than the life they have led in the past.”).
358. Leebaert v. Harrington, 332 F.3d 134 (2d Cir. 2003).
359. Id.
360. Id. at 137.
361. Id. at 136; see Brief for Plaintiff–Appellant at 18, Leebaert v. Harrington, 332
F.3d 134 (2d Cir. 2002) (No. 02-7399) (“ ‘Character’ is something that Mr.
Leebaert believes that he alone must teach his sons.”).
362. Leebaert, 332 F.3d at 138.
363. Brief for Plaintiff–Appellant, supra note 361, at 18.
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conflicts with a parent’s religious beliefs,364 the parent has the right
“to choose alternatives for [his or her] own children inside the public
schools.”365
Leebaert’s objection to the health education curriculum reflected
his greater concern that the true goal of public education was the “co-
ercive standardization” of the nation’s children.366  Interposing the
Constitution as a bulwark against state-mandated uniformity, Meyer
and Pierce were, in his view, a clear denunciation of “the intellectual
roots of the ‘it takes a village to raise a child’ philosophy in favor of
parents[’] rights.”367  Accordingly, Leebaert argued that philosophy
would produce sons who grew up “like ‘Stepford children,’ mere carbon
copies of all the other students . . . when it comes to their values and
their character.”368  However, Leebaert’s argument against state-
mandated conformity was anything but a plea for the intellectual and
moral autonomy of his children.  What Leebaert wanted was “to im-
part to his sons his own religious, moral and ethical values free of
interference or preemption by school officials.”369  That a child may
grow up to be a carbon copy of his parent, serving only to mirror his
father’s values, was acceptable—not because there is any difference
between state-mandated and parent-mandated conformity as far as
the welfare of the child is concerned, but simply because it is the par-
ent’s God-given right to create the child in his own image.  In
Leebaert’s view, the parent has a moral proprietary right in the child,
not a fiduciary responsibility to ensure that the child grows up with
the capacity to choose his own values, free of interference or
preemption.
No matter what curriculum is required by the public schools, par-
ents remain free to inculcate their values in countless formal and in-
formal ways.  This is the lesson of Meyer and Pierce.  To support his
argument that only the parent has the authority to teach subject mat-
364. For Leebaert’s objection to the health education curriculum, see Leebaert, 332
F.3d at 138 (“I believe that the way the school system teaches the subjects to
which I sought to opt my son out of, is anti-religion.  For one example, it doesn’t
support a married man and woman together as the basic unit of the family.  The
school teaches that this unit can be comprised of anything or anyone, that any-
thing you say can be a family.  This contradicts my religious beliefs.”).
365. Brief for Plainitff–Appellant, supra note 361, at 27.  In support of his opt-out ar-
gument, Leebaert relied on the curriculum requirement cases. See id. at. 23–33.
366. Id. at 27.
367. Id. at 26; see also id. at 27 (“At the time, it was the culturally conservative and
religiously Protestant elements of society that were generally aligned with the
forces advancing the coercive standardization of children.  They were exception-
ally hostile to the world view of Catholic immigrants, and sought to use universal
public education as a tool to create a homogenized, Protestant society.”) (footnote
omitted).
368. Id. at 18–19.
369. Id. at 19.
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ter related to character education, Leebaert described how, when he
teaches his children, he goes beyond the conformist character-building
methods of the public schools.  He cited as an example a boat trip that
he and his sons took down the Connecticut River.  They built the boat
themselves, and traveled more than 400 miles from the river’s source
in New Hampshire to the Long Island Sound.370
This is not something that the average parent teaches his children, and it
demonstrates the extent to which Mr. Leebaert wants his sons to go beyond
the secular teachings of the Fairfield School system which he believes reduce
the potential of his sons to the secular culture’s views on the development of
character and right and wrong.  Mr. Leebaert’s sons, Corky and Timmy Bruce,
are both honor students at Roger Ludlowe Middle School and, in addition to
everything else, are adept at violin, full-contact karate, animal tracking and
other interests.  The flat boat Connecticut River trip is just one example of the
lengths to which Mr. Leebaert goes to personally build character in his
sons.371
Leebaert is exactly right, but he proves too much.  Of course, the state
does not replace the parent as moral educator.  Under Meyer and
Pierce, the parent remains a private source of moral authority (as do a
host of private entities).  Indeed, against these private sources “the
state is normally at a disadvantage.”372  Thus, even if the state man-
dated curricular requirements for all schools, public and private, the
allocation of educational authority would be shared by parent and
state.  Indeed, without some kind of compulsory curriculum, educa-
tional pluralism exists only in the sense that different schools are each
free to teach a closed set of values, not in the “thicker” sense that each
child’s world is opened to divergent sets of values.  In this sense, a
regime of compulsory curricular requirements for all schools means
more diversity, not less.373
370. Brief for Plaintiff–Appellant, supra note 361, at 19–20
371. Id. at 20.
372. See Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 599 (1940), overruled by W.
Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (“What the school authori-
ties are really asserting is the right to awaken in the child’s mind considerations
as to the significance of the flag contrary to those implanted by the parent.  In
such an attempt the state is normally at a disadvantage in competing with the
parent’s authority, so long—and this is the vital aspect of religious toleration—as
parents are unmolested in their right to counteract by their own persuasiveness
the wisdom and rightness of those loyalties which the state’s educational system
is seeking to promote.”).
373. See CALLAN, supra note 28, at 5 (“The cultivation of serious and independent ethi-
cal criticism, and the enlargement of the imagination that process entails, will
naturally conduce to the diversity in how people live . . . .”); Abner S. Greene, Why
Vouchers are Unconstitutional, and Why They’re Not, 13 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS
& PUB. POL’Y 397, 407 (1999) (“Requiring all children to attend public schools,
while leaving parents free during non-public-school hours to teach their children
at home or at church or synagogue, would ensure that all children are exposed to
multiple sources of authority and of knowledge.”); see also Parker v. Hurley, 514
F.3d 87, 105 (1st Cir. 2008) (“[T]he mere fact that a child is exposed on occasion in
public school to a concept offensive to a parent’s religious belief does not inhibit
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Finally, if courts made the child’s educational best interests a par-
amount concern, it would be less likely that the classroom would be-
come a forum for a parent’s personal religious agenda.  The fear of this
outcome has led some public school officials to deny young children the
opportunity to express religious viewpoints at school.374  Here, the
the parent from instructing the child differently.  A parent whose ‘child is ex-
posed to sensitive topics or information [at school] remains free to discuss these
matters and to place them in the family’s moral or religious context, or to supple-
ment the information with more appropriate materials.’”) (quoting C.N. v. Ridge-
wood Bd. of Educ., 430 F.3d 159, 185 (3d Cir. 2005)); cf. Elk Grove Unified Sch.
Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1 (2004) (finding that a school requirement to recite
Pledge of Allegiance does not impair parent’s right to instruct his daughter in his
religious views); GUTMANN, supra note 28, at 42 (“A democratic state of education
recognizes that educational authority must be shared among parents, citizens,
and professional educators even though such sharing does not guarantee that
power will be wedded to knowledge, that parents can successfully pass their
prejudices on to their children, or that education will be neutral among compet-
ing conceptions of the good life.”); Ira C. Lupu, Home Education, Religious Lib-
erty, and the Separation of Powers, 67 B.U. L. REV. 971, 976–77 (1987) (“Adults
other than parents may serve as sources of information, models of behavior, and
safe outlets for concerns that children feel they cannot share with their parents,
including concerns about the parents themselves.  Parents, of course, can be simi-
larly supportive in helping their children cope with the tensions of other relation-
ships in their lives.  Children raised in a regime of separated power are rather
less likely to feel at risk and far more likely to feel themselves to be citizens of
their larger communities than children raised in a regime of highly concentrated
authority.  Parents should have substantial power to choose their children’s
teachers, but there is reason to be troubled, and sufficient constitutional warrant
for states to act, when parents choose only themselves.”). See generally Ira C.
Lupu, The Separation of Powers and the Protection of Children, 61 U. CHI. L. REV.
1317 (1994) (arguing that the concept of power separation can be used produc-
tively to mediate conflicts in the family setting).
374. For cases involving religious speech by children in the public schools, see Busch v.
Marple Newtown Sch. Dist., 567 F.3d 89 (3d Cir. 2009); Curry ex rel. Curry v.
Hensiner, 513 F.3d 570 (6th Cir. 2008); Peck v. Baldwinsville Cent. Sch. Dist., 426
F.3d 617 (2d Cir. 2005); Settle v. Dickson Cnty. Sch. Bd., 53 F.3d 152 (6th Cir.
1995); DeNooyer v. Merinelli, 12 F.3d 211 (6th Cir. 1993); M.B. ex rel. Martin v.
Liverpool Cent. Sch. Dist., 487 F. Supp. 2d 117 (N.D.N.Y. 2007); O.T. ex rel.
Turton v. Frenchtown Elementary Sch. Dist., 465 F. Supp. 2d 369 (D.N.J. 2006);
Duran v. Nitsche, 780 F. Supp. 1048 (E.D. Pa. 1991); and see also Chad Allred,
Guarding the Treasure: Protection of Student Religious Speech in the Classroom,
22 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 741 (1999) (stating that private religious expression
should be allowed in the classroom when accompanied by teacher explanation);
Lisa Shaw Roy, Inculcation, Bias, and Viewpoint Discrimination in Public
Schools, 32 PEPP. L. REV. 647 (2005) (arguing that religious speech could be al-
lowed in classroom under a “no-bias” principle); Jennifer L. Specht, Note,
Younger Students, Different Rights?: Examining the Standard for Student-Initi-
ated Religious Free Speech in Elementary Schools, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 1313
(2006) (advocating adoption of a standard that gives substantial discretion to
school officials but still allows student speech).
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child is silenced directly.  In C.H. v. Oliva,375 for example, a first-
grade teacher, Ms. Oliva, invited students to read a favorite story to
the class.  The only condition placed on the student’s selection of mate-
rial “was that Ms Oliva would review the stories proposed by the stu-
dents to insure that their length and complexity were appropriate for
first graders.”376  One student, Z.H., chose to read a story titled “A Big
Family,” which told part of the biblical account of Jacob and Esau.377
The passage itself was free of any overt religious content, but Z.H. was
not allowed to read the story to the class because of its biblical pedi-
gree.378  Concerned that young students would not be able “to distin-
guish messages a teacher specifically advocates from those she merely
allows to be expressed in the classroom,” the Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit upheld the school’s decision.379  The court was also wor-
ried that the school might infringe upon the right of parents to direct
the religious upbringing of their children:
It is not unreasonable to expect that parents of non-Christian children would
resent exposure of their six-year-old children to a reading from the Bible.  Nor
is it unreasonable to expect that some parents of Christian first graders would
regard a compelled classroom exposure to material from the Bible as an in-
fringement of their parental right to guide the religious development of their
children at this stage.380
This is caution to a fault.  The duty of the state to inculcate “toler-
ance of divergent political and religious views” is poorly served when
public school officials deny children freedom of religious expression.
Too often, the public school classroom is “cleansed” of religious points
of view.381  Yet, such caution is not always unwarranted, for some of
these cases involve parents who engage in their own form of religious
silencing by using their child as a religious spokesperson.  In order to
promote a particular religious viewpoint, these parents are willing to
put religious words in the mouth of a child.  In Walz ex rel. Walz v. Egg
Harbor Township Board of Education,382 Daniel Walz wanted to dis-
tribute candy canes at a kindergarten classroom party, an innocuous
enough request—except that attached to these candy canes was a re-
375. 195 F.3d 167, 172 (3d Cir. 1999), vacated and reh’g granted, 197 F.3d 63 (3d Cir.
1999), aff’d in part on reh’g, 226 F.3d 198 (3d Cir. 2000) (en banc) (affirming
dismissal of religious viewpoint discrimination claim).
376. Id. at 169.
377. Id.
378. Id.
379. Id. at 175.
380. Id.
381. See, e.g., WARREN NORD, RELIGION & AMERICAN EDUCATION: RETHINKING A NA-
TIONAL DILEMMA 138–59 (1995); Jay D. Wexler, Preparing for the Clothed Public
Square: Teaching about Religion, Civic Education, and the Constitution, 43 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 1159, 1181–82 (2002) (describing studies that show how “history
and other social studies textbooks systematically ignore[ ] religious topics and
themes”).
382. 342 F.3d 271 (3d Cir. 2003).
\\server05\productn\N\NEB\89-2\NEB204.txt unknown Seq: 64 15-NOV-10 12:09
2010] THE PARENT AS (MERE) EDUCATIONAL TRUSTEE 353
ligious story titled “A Candy Maker’s Witness.”  The story (apocry-
phal, it turns out) tells how the candy came to “incorporate[ ] several
symbols for the birth, ministry, and death of Jesus Christ.”383  The
candy maker chose the color white to symbolize “the Virgin Birth and
the sinless nature of Jesus”; he made it hard “to symbolize the Solid
Rock, the foundation of the Church, and firmness of the promises of
God”; he made the candy “in the form of a ‘J’ to represent the precious
name of Jesus, who came to earth as our Savior”; and he used three
small stripes “to show the stripes of the scouring [sic] Jesus received
by which we are healed,” with the large red stripe “for the blood shed
by Christ on the cross so that we could have the promise of eternal
life.”384
Where a public school restricts religious speech, the question is
whether the child has been subjected to discrimination on the basis of
religious viewpoint.  The resolution of that question usually turns on
the court’s choice of a standard by which to judge the constitutionality
of such restrictions.  Can schools discriminate on the basis of religious
viewpoint if such regulation is reasonably related to pedagogical con-
cerns?  Or, does the constitutional standard require that a school’s re-
striction be not only reasonable, but also viewpoint neutral, a
standard that would require schools to show a compelling interest for
restricting speech on the basis of religious viewpoint?  The circuit
courts are split on this issue.385  However, under either standard, the
court must distinguish between expression that describes religious be-
lief (generally acceptable to the courts) and expression that promotes
religious belief (generally unacceptable).  It is a nearly impossible line
to walk, and one that takes courts perilously close to making forbidden
judgments about religious belief.
Here, too, the courts need not weave such a tangled constitutional
web.  The Walz court distinguished personal religious observance from
outward religious promotion, and concluded that Daniel sought to pro-
mote a specific religious message.  Yet, Daniel sought no such thing.
383. Id. at 274.
384. Id.
385. Compare Ward v. Hickey, 996 F.2d, 448, 452 (1st Cir. 1993) (holding that educa-
tors may make viewpoint-based decisions about school-sponsored speech), and
Fleming v. Jefferson Cnty. Sch. Dist. R-1, 298 F.3d 918, 926–28 (10th Cir. 2002)
(same), with Planned Parenthood of S. Nev., Inc. v. Clark County Sch. Dist., 941
F.2d 817, 829 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc) (applying viewpoint neutrality standard),
and Searcey v. Harris, 888 F.2d 1314, 1319 n.7 (11th Cir. 1989) (same).  In C.H. v
Oliva, a panel of the Third Circuit held that “a viewpoint-based restriction on
student speech in the classroom may be reasonably related to legitimate pedagog-
ical concerns and thus permissible.”  On a rehearing en banc, the circuit was
equally divided on the question. See 195 F.3d 167, 172 (3d Cir. 1999), vacated
and reh’g granted, 197 F.3d 63 (3d Cir. 1999), aff’d in part on reh’g, 226 F.3d 198
(3d Cir. 2000) (en banc) (affirming dismissal of religious viewpoint discrimination
claim). .
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It was, in the court’s words, “[h]is mother’s stated purpose . . . to pro-
mote a religious message through the channel of a benign classroom
activity.”386  Daniel was simply a litigation foil for a parent, one who
effectively sought to make her child a spiritual foil as well.  Where the
child speaks in a way that is otherwise appropriate for an assignment
or activity, religious expression need not be silenced.  But, cases like
Walz have little, if anything, to do with the religious expression of
children, and school officials rightly refuse to allow the classroom to
become a forum for the parent’s personal religious agenda.
The state has a compelling interest in teaching children the funda-
mental “ ‘habits and manners of civility’ essential to a democratic soci-
ety,” but if children are to learn a civility that is more than mere
manners, then the state must let them speak for themselves, whether
they speak the language of reason or faith, and for their community
and culture, whether that background is informed by religious or secu-
lar values.387  If, as the Court has said, “[t]he classroom is peculiarly
the ‘marketplace of ideas,’”388 the voices of religious children must be
allowed to be heard for the educational benefit of the entire class.  The
public school classroom, at every level, should be a forum where stu-
dents are exposed to a variety of viewpoints, secular and religious.
The idea that students benefit from exposure to opposing viewpoints
only makes sense if that benefit flows in both directions.  It is a benefit
whose very basis is reciprocity.  The classroom that welcomes appro-
priate religious expression may also be a less threatening place for
some religious parents.389
386. Walz, 342 F.3d at 280.
387. Cf., e.g., NORD, supra note 381, at 202–03 (“Liberal education has both a con-
servative and a liberating task: it should provide students a ballast of historical
identities and values at the same time that it gives them an understanding of
alternatives and provides critical distance on the particularities of their respec-
tive inheritances. . . .  The central tension of a liberal education, properly under-
stood, lies in its commitment to initiating students into the communities of
memory which tentatively define them, and, at the same time, nurturing critical
reflection by initiating them into an ongoing conversation that enables them to
understand and appreciate alternative ways of living and thinking.”); Steven C.
Rockefeller, Comment, in MULTICULTURALISM: EXAMINING THE POLITICS OF RECOG-
NITION 87, 97–98 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1994) (“[A]ny liberal democratic politics
committed to the ideals of freedom and equality cannot escape the demand that it
create inclusive and sustaining social environments that respect all peoples in
their cultural diversity, giving them a feeling of belonging to the larger
community.”).
388. Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967).
389. Cf., e.g., Brighouse, supra note 46, at 271 (exposing children to a wide array of
religious and non-religious views may “address the reasonable fear of many relig-
ious parents that views like their own will be either ignored or, worse, ridiculed
in the schools”).
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In fact, it would be the better approach to make teaching about
religion a regular part of the public school curriculum.390  Where
states regulate the curriculum of private schools, they could impose
the same requirement.391  Can our schools teach about religion with-
out teaching religion?  The Supreme Court thought so, even as it
struck down state-mandated religious exercises.392  Can our public
schools provide a basic education without teaching about religion?
The Supreme Court thought not,393 and, given the place that religion
occupies historically and culturally, for good reason.  Teaching about
religion can be a productive part of a more broadly based civic educa-
tion.394  It might, as its proponents contend, breed tolerance and re-
spect395 and let students navigate some of the moral cross-currents
that accompany religious pluralism.396  Still, it would be a mistake to
proceed as though the study of religion could be, or should be, cabined
within the civics classroom.  The study of religion may be a productive
part of classrooms devoted to other social sciences as well as the hu-
manities.  It would also be a mistake to underestimate the emotional
and psychological effect of studying religion.  Once admitted to the
public school curriculum, the study of religion may work—indeed, we
can be certain that, for some students, it will work—to prompt ques-
390. On the movement to teach about religion in the public schools, see, for example,
KENT GREENAWALT, DOES GOD BELONG IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS? 79–159 (2005); Wex-
ler, supra note 381, at 1172–91.
391. Greenawalt argues that “[i]f parents who choose against public education need
not expose their children to offensive ideas, that is some basis, though hardly a
conclusive one, for believing that the state may also accommodate parents whose
children are in public schools.” See id. at 180.  This argument begs the question
whether parents who choose against public education should be allowed to shield
their children from offensive ideas. See GUTMANN, supra note 28, at 115–25 (ar-
guing that state can require all schools to teach common democratic values, in-
cluding religious toleration).
392. Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 225 (1963) (“Nothing we
have said here indicates that such study of the Bible or of religion, when
presented objectively as part of a secular program of education, may not be ef-
fected consistently with the First Amendment.”).
393. Id. at 255 (“[I]t might well be said that one’s education is not complete without a
study of comparative religion or the history of religion and its relationship to the
advancement of civilization.”); see also id. at 300 (Brennan, J., concurring) (“[I]t
would be impossible to teach meaningfully many subjects in the social sciences or
the humanities without some mention of religion.”).
394. On teaching about religion as part of civic education, see, for example, NORD,
supra note 382, at 199–235; Wexler, supra note 382, at 1200–42.  The challenge of
teaching about religion in the public schools is not a new one. See WILLIAM CLAY-
TON BOWER, CHURCH AND STATE IN EDUCATION 57–77 (1944).
395. See Wexler, supra note 382, at 1219–20.
396. Cf. id. at 1170 (arguing that “schools should teach about religion so that students
can make fully informed decisions about laws and other government actions af-
fecting religious belief and practice and so they can understand the myriad ways
that religious beliefs affect the way that many Americans think and talk about
issues of public importance”).
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tions about self and family, to create uncertainty about religious tradi-
tions, and to cause some degree of separation from parents and other
spiritual mentors.  If the public school curriculum embraces the neces-
sity of free, bold, and continuing inquiry—as it must—then it is pre-
cisely this kind of free-thinking, in matters religious as well as
secular, that public school curriculum ought to encourage—and this is
precisely why provisions to allow parents to opt out of religious studies
are a bad idea.397  Of course, the state cannot restrict what else par-
ents teach their children, but the law of parent–child relations teaches
that the state can and should work to guarantee every child an open
intellectual and spiritual future.
V. CONCLUSION
“The child is not put into the hands of parents alone.  It is not born to hear but
a few voices.  It is brought at birth into a vast, we may say an infinite, school.
The universe is charged with its education.”
William Ellery Channing398
Though John Milton protested pre-publication censorship, Milton’s
God was less troubled by restrictions on the spectrum of available
knowledge.  When God’s children disobey his sole commandment—a
commandment that would deny Adam and Eve moral knowledge, or
the capacity, that is, to choose good over evil—they are cast out of
their home and sentenced to death for their disobedience.  Their fall, it
turns out, is a fortunate one, because their disobedience is a prerequi-
site to “[a] Paradise within . . . , happier far.”399  The law of par-
ent–child relations has long embodied a similar belief that education
(translated literally, a “leading away from”) is the path away from
childhood and toward moral and intellectual enfranchisement.  The
work of preparing the child to make free and independent choices is
entrusted to the parent.  It is a challenging and somber task, for it
means the loss of the child—it means allowing children to leave their
homes and leave behind the ways of their parents.  Or, at least, it
means giving children the choice to do so.  It is little wonder, then,
397. But see Wexler, supra note 382, at 1261–62; cf. Steven G. Gey, When Is Religious
Speech Not “Free Speech”?, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 379 (2000) (arguing that religious
expression violates the Establishment Clause where non-adherents are forced to
opt out of the benefits of a public education).
398. WILLIAM ELLERY CHANNING, REMARKS ON EDUCATION, in THE WORKS OF WILLIAM
ELLERY CHANNING 117, 117–18 (Boston, American Unitarian Association 1886).
Channing writes that parents “are not the only educators of their offspring, but
must divide the work with other and numerous agents.”  In this, they should
rejoice, “for, were the young confined to domestic influences, each generation
would be a copy of the preceding, and the progress of society would stop.” Id. at
117.
399. See MILTON, supra note 2, at 404.
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that we would want to transform this sacred trust into a sacred right,
a right that effectively allows parents to shield their children from
choice and its attendant responsibilities and sufferings.  Yet, such a
right comes at too great a cost.  The law of parent–child relations
shields children from this sort of “protection,” ensuring that children
receive a truly public education, one that transports them beyond fa-
miliar boundaries and that burdens them with the necessity of moral
judgment.  In this way, the liberal state provides a much needed check
on the narcissism of the child’s guardians, both public and private.  It
provides an education that, at its best, makes young adults truly
free—free to stand and free to fall.  When Adam and Eve leave Para-
dise, as Milton tells the story, they shed some natural tears, but “the
world was all before them,”400 as it should be for all children at the
end of a proper education.
400. Id. at 406.
